BEC二级模拟试题5参考答案
2008-09-01来源:
Part Three. Questions 23-30.
As German broad money supply(M3)now seems set to exceed its target for the third year in a row, pressure on the Bundesbank is growing to ignore what Bundesbank president, Mr.Hans Tieteyer, calls an "important intermediate indicator". The Bundesbank itself has been strengthening the hand of critics of monetary targeting by lowering interest rates sharply despite very strong money supply growth in the past six months.
Abandoning M3 now as a signpost for monetary policy would be a grave mistake for at least two reasons. First, there is on convincing evidence so far that the long-run relationship between money supply growth and inflation has ceased to exist. Publicly available independent studies , such as those from the Kiel institute of World Economics , have found some evidence for a short-term disturbance in the demand for money in the wake of German unification. But they have failed to reject the hypothesis that the long-run demand for money has remained stable.
Second, excessive money supply growth has reflected the partial monetary financing of government debt ,which ,if continued ,could threaten the purchasing power of the D-Mark.
In recent months Bundesbank representatives and other observers have attempted to explain the rampant growth of money supply on the basis of portfolio shifts between money and "monetary capital" which means the longer-term liabilities of the credit institutions. It is excluded from M3.
In reality, however, expansion of credit has been driving money supply growth. At the end of 1993, total bank credit amounted to about DM3, 800bn, M3 money to DMI , 900bn, and monetary capital to roughly DMZ , 100bn. With bank credit rising at an annual rate of 10. 3 per cent between the end of 1991 and the end of 1993 ,monetary capital would have to grow substantially above this rate to neutralize the effects of credit growth on M3.
In fact, monetary capital grew at an annual average rate of only 7. 7 pre cent ,so the annual rise of M3 during this period was 8. 7 per cent.
If the expansion of bank lending had been used to finance investment in future productive capacity ,there would have been little reason to worry.
However, between the second half of 1990 and the second half of 1993, real investment in machinery and equipment in united Germany declined by about 4 per cent. This suggests that most of the credit was used for housing construction and consumption.
An important source of the demand for bank credit was the public sector. Between the end of 1989 and mid-1993 ,public debt rose by 52 per cent. By-the end of 1994 ,the rise will be more than 115 percent. The lion's share of this increase was incurred to finance transfers to east Germany. Since the appetite of German domestic savers for government bonds was not sufficient to absorb the `new debt, the government exported part of it by selling bonds abroad ,and allowed the monetization of another part.
As German broad money supply(M3)now seems set to exceed its target for the third year in a row, pressure on the Bundesbank is growing to ignore what Bundesbank president, Mr.Hans Tieteyer, calls an "important intermediate indicator". The Bundesbank itself has been strengthening the hand of critics of monetary targeting by lowering interest rates sharply despite very strong money supply growth in the past six months.
Abandoning M3 now as a signpost for monetary policy would be a grave mistake for at least two reasons. First, there is on convincing evidence so far that the long-run relationship between money supply growth and inflation has ceased to exist. Publicly available independent studies , such as those from the Kiel institute of World Economics , have found some evidence for a short-term disturbance in the demand for money in the wake of German unification. But they have failed to reject the hypothesis that the long-run demand for money has remained stable.
Second, excessive money supply growth has reflected the partial monetary financing of government debt ,which ,if continued ,could threaten the purchasing power of the D-Mark.
In recent months Bundesbank representatives and other observers have attempted to explain the rampant growth of money supply on the basis of portfolio shifts between money and "monetary capital" which means the longer-term liabilities of the credit institutions. It is excluded from M3.
In reality, however, expansion of credit has been driving money supply growth. At the end of 1993, total bank credit amounted to about DM3, 800bn, M3 money to DMI , 900bn, and monetary capital to roughly DMZ , 100bn. With bank credit rising at an annual rate of 10. 3 per cent between the end of 1991 and the end of 1993 ,monetary capital would have to grow substantially above this rate to neutralize the effects of credit growth on M3.
In fact, monetary capital grew at an annual average rate of only 7. 7 pre cent ,so the annual rise of M3 during this period was 8. 7 per cent.
If the expansion of bank lending had been used to finance investment in future productive capacity ,there would have been little reason to worry.
However, between the second half of 1990 and the second half of 1993, real investment in machinery and equipment in united Germany declined by about 4 per cent. This suggests that most of the credit was used for housing construction and consumption.
An important source of the demand for bank credit was the public sector. Between the end of 1989 and mid-1993 ,public debt rose by 52 per cent. By-the end of 1994 ,the rise will be more than 115 percent. The lion's share of this increase was incurred to finance transfers to east Germany. Since the appetite of German domestic savers for government bonds was not sufficient to absorb the `new debt, the government exported part of it by selling bonds abroad ,and allowed the monetization of another part.
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