权势之争:董事长与CEO之间的种种

Why then do JPMorgan and many others not follow suit? For two bad reasons: clubbiness and fear. Six of JPMorgan’s 11 directors are or were chairmen-CEOs. Its presiding director – charged with reining in the boss, if necessary – is currently Lee Raymond. He is no pushover. Steve Coll, author of Private Empire, wrote that he “ruled over ExxonMobil like an Emir”. But he is also the last person likely to spearhead a campaign for more power-sharing at the top.
那么为何摩根大通等许多公司没有进行仿效？两个蹩脚的理由是俱乐部文化和担忧。在摩根大通的11位董事中，有6位董事现在或者曾经身兼董事长和CEO两职。目前，摩根大通的主持董事是李•雷蒙德(Lee Raymond)，他负责在必要时限制CEO的权力。雷蒙德绝不是一个轻易屈服的人。《私人帝国》(Private Empire)一书的作者史蒂夫•科尔(Steve Coll)写道，他“就像一位埃米尔（Emir，对穆斯林统治者的尊称，译者注）统治着埃克森美孚(ExxonMobil)”。但他也最不可能率先推动高层分享权力。

Directors and chief executives also know that Ken Lewis quit as chief executive of Bank of America mere months after shareholders voted by a tiny margin to appoint an independent chairman in 2009. The $6.2bn losses on the “London whale” derivatives trade and damaging allegations that risk management failed have blotted Mr Dimon’s shiny reputation. But JPMorgan’s directors must be afraid that if they appoint a separate chairman, Mr Dimon, an executive they still trust, will feel pushed towards the exit.
董事和CEO们也知道，2009年，就在美国银行(Bank of America)的股东以微弱多数通过任命一位独立董事长数月后，肯•刘易斯(Ken Lewis)辞去了CEO职务。摩根大通在“伦敦鲸”衍生品交易上亏损62亿美元，以及外界对其风险管理失败的颇有杀伤力的指控，已经让戴蒙名誉扫地。但摩根大通的董事们必定担心，如果他们任命一个独立的董事长，那么他们仍然信任的戴蒙将会觉得自己要被扫地出门。

I think such concerns are, to quote Mr Dimon’s initial verdict on the derivatives debacle, “a tempest in a teapot”. Citigroup operates under a chairman and a chief executive. JPMorgan itself and rival Morgan Stanley have in the past taken the half-step of splitting the role to smooth the transition to a new chief executive. One of the arguments made by BNY Mellon for double-badging its boss – that a “substantial majority of our peers” do it – already looks a little flimsy.
正如戴蒙最初听闻衍生品交易巨亏事件之后所言，我个人认为此类担忧是“茶壶里的风暴”。花旗集团(Citigroup)分别有一个董事长和CEO。摩根大通自身及其竞争对手摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)过去曾迈出一小步，将这两个职位分离以便向任命新CEO实现平稳过渡。纽约梅隆银行(BNY Mellon)提出CEO身兼两职的理由之一是“绝大多数银行”都这么做，现在看来这个理由有些牵强。

A split may not fit every company, so it shouldn’t be compulsory. A non-executive chairman couldn’t save Royal Bank of Scotland from near-collapse or keep Barclays out of the ethical abyss. New research also suggests that “demoting” chairmen of companies that are performing well undermines the share price.
分开不一定适用于每个公司，因此它不应是强制性的。一个非执行董事长不可能让苏格兰皇家银行(RBS)免于接近破产的境地，也不会把巴克莱(Barclays)救出道德深渊。新的研究还发现，“降职使用”表现优秀的董事长会让该公司股价下跌。

But independent chairmanship should be the model for companies coming to market or planning a leadership succession. The role is not hard to grasp – the non-executive chairman runs the board and the chief executive runs the business – but it must be regularly explained. Too often, US chairmen see their appointment as an excuse to exercise their underused executive muscles.
但独立的董事长角色应该成为上市公司或计划更换领导层的公司的模板。这种角色并不难理解——非执行董事长掌管董事会，而CEO管理企业——但公司必须定期解释这种角色。美国公司的董事长往往利用其职位来行使他们未充分行使的执行权力。

The biggest problem in the US, however, is that the debate about which model to choose frequently turns into a test of machismo, in which activist investors vie to strip the chairman’s epaulettes from the humiliated executive’s shoulders. Splitting the roles is no panacea, but as long as the boss thinks of it as cruel and unusual punishment, directors will have an excuse to leave a vital tool of good governance in its box.
然而，美国最大的问题在于，围绕选择哪种模式的辩论往往会演变成一场“全武行”——维权投资者恨不得一脚把CEO从董事长职位上踹下去。分离这两个职位并非万灵药，但只要CEO认为分离是一个无情且非同寻常的惩罚措施，董事们就有理由暂不启用这个通往良好治理的关键工具。