美国对华为的担忧究竟从何而来?

One fundamental failure of all this official hand-wringing is that it neglects the fact that many if not most of the components, with the exception of certain higher-value chips like those from Intel, are manufactured in China. Cisco Systems and Juniper Networks in the U.S., Alcatel-Lucent in France and Ericsson in Sweden, all use Chinese-made parts and carry out at least some portion of the final assembly of their equipment in China.
美国官方对国家安全威胁的担忧存在一处根本性的疏忽，那就是它忽视了这样一个事实，即除英特尔(Intel)芯片等某些价值更高的芯片外，很多、甚至可以说大部分电信设备组件都是在中国制造的。美国的思科系统(Cisco Systems)和瞻博网络(Juniper Networks)、法国的阿尔卡特朗讯(Alcatel-Lucent)和瑞典的爱立信(Ericsson)都使用中国生产的零部件，并且设备的最终组装至少有部分是在中国进行的。

Huawei certainly hasn't done itself any favors. While its most senior U.S. employee described the company as 'an open book' in a surprisingly short segment on CBS's '60 Minutes' last night (see the video below), its founder and chief executive, Ren Zhengfei, has never sat for an interview with a Western media outlet. And the precise ownership of the company's shares are murky. U.S. regulators have prevented it from making certain acquisitions, and in Australia it was blocked from bidding on portions of a project to build a national broadband Internet network.
华为无疑也没有给自己带来任何助益。尽管在周日晚间CBS电视台“60分钟”(60 Minutes)节目一个出奇短的环节中，华为级别最高的美国员工将该公司描述为一个“让人一目了然的公司”，但该公司创始人兼首席执行长任正非却从未接受过西方媒体机构的采访。此外，该公司股份的确切所有权也晦暗不明。美国监管机构阻止其进行某些收购，在澳大利亚，华为被禁止竞标国家宽带网络建设项目的部分工作。

It hasn't gotten to be the world's largest telecom equipment concern for nothing. Wireless phone networks in Africa rely heavily on inexpensive gear sold by Huawei. There are suspicions about its dealings in this area too, though they are mostly economic. Huawei has a history of undercutting Western rivals in competitive bids by as much as 5 percent to 15 percent, raising suspicion that it is the benefactor of state-sponsored subsidies. However, it's also to the benefit of these rivals to stoke the national security concerns as much as possible.
华为成为世界上最令人担忧的电信设备公司自有原因。非洲的手机网络严重依赖华为销售的低价设备。有人还对华为在非洲的业务表示怀疑，不过大部分是经济方面的怀疑。华为历来在竞标时出价比西方竞争对手最多可低5%至15%，这令人怀疑该公司是政府补贴的受益者。不过，这些竞争对手也会从尽可能地为国家安全担忧推波助澜中获得好处。

All told, it's not as though there is no reason to be suspicious of Huawei, if only because the U.S. and its allies know too well from their own actions in recent years about the potential for electronic espionage, surveillance and warfare.
总之，华为并非毫无值得怀疑的地方，美国及其盟友从近年来自身行动中就已经深刻理解到了可能出现的电子间谍、侦察和战争。

For its part, Huawei defended itself and attacked the report in a response today (read it in full here). The company said the committee's report, an 11-month effort, 'failed to provide clear information or evidence to substantiate the legitimacy of the Committee's concerns' and 'appears to have been committed to a predetermined outcome' and 'employs many rumors and speculations to prove non-existent accusations.'
华为周一为自己进行辩护，在一份回应中对美国会报告进行了反击。该公司说，委员会经过11个月的调查得出的报告未提供明确信息或证据来证明委员会的担忧是合理的，报告似乎是在为预先设定的结论自圆其说，使用了很多传言和猜测来证明无端的指控。

Without having read the classified portions of the report, which are said to contain more specifics - it mentions only vague instances of 'beaconing,' which is intended to mean sending data back to China - it's hard to argue with Huawei's position.
在未看到报告保密部分内容的情况下（据说包括更多详情），很难反驳华为的立场。报告只提到一些隐约的“信标”活动，“信标”活动指的是向中国传回数据。

Nor is it easy to dismiss the committee's fears out of hand. Which brings us to the possible unintended result of all this: Might China respond with its own restrictions against U.S. telecom firms like Cisco and Juniper? Is this the first shot of a telecom trade war? We'll see.
当然，我们也难以完全忽略委员会的担忧。这就让我们可能面临这样一种意想不到的结果：中国是否可能做出回应，针对思科和瞻博网络等美国电信公司推出限制措施？这是否意味着一场电信贸易战打响了第一枪？我们将拭目以待。

If that happens, expect Cisco to be hurt more than Huawei. U.S. sales account for only 4 percent of its overall revenue, whereas Cisco's operations in Asia, the Pacific Rim and China account for more than 16 percent, and China was its second fastest-growing market in that region after Japan.
如果发生电信贸易战，预计思科将比华为更受伤。美国销售额仅占华为总收入的4%，而亚洲、环太平洋地区和中国业务却占了思科总业务的16%以上。此外，中国是思科在该地区仅次于日本的增长速度第二大快的市场。