2011年秋季高级口译笔试阅读原题出处: 欧洲为何不再举足轻重

Why Europe no longer matters
欧洲为何不再举足轻重

When Defense Secretary Robert Gates devoted his final policy speech this month to berating NATO and our European allies, he was engaging in a time-honored tradition: Americans have worried about Europeans shirking their share of global burdens since the start of the 60-year-old alliance.
美国国防部长罗伯特·盖茨本月在最后一次发表政策讲话时痛批北约和我们的欧洲盟友，他这是在追随一个由来已久的传统：自从北约这个联盟60 年前成立以来， 美国人就一直担心欧洲推卸其所承担的那份全球重任。

Gates sounded a pessimistic note, warning of “the real possibility for a dim if not dismal future for the transatlantic alliance.” Yet, the outgoing Pentagon chief may not have been pessimistic enough. The U.S.-European partnership that proved so central to managing and winning the Cold War will inevitably play a far diminished role in the years to come. To some extent, we’re already there: If NATO didn’t exist today, would anyone feel compelled to create it? The honest, if awkward, answer is no.
盖茨语气悲观，警告"这个跨大西洋联盟存在着前景不说凄惨至少也是黯淡的切实可能" 。不过， 这位即将离职的五角大楼统帅也许还不够悲观。美欧伙伴关系曾在应对并打赢冷、冷战中发挥首要作用， 但在未来的岁月里，它的作用将不可避免地大大降低。从某种程度上讲， 我们现在已经到了这步田地：如果现在没有北约，有谁会觉得必须建立这样一个组织吗? 诚实但令人尴尬的回答是: 没有。

In the coming decades, Europe’s influence on affairs beyond its borders will be sharply limited, and it is in other regions, not Europe, that the 21st century will be most clearly forged and defined.
未来几十年，欧洲对自身边界以外事务的影响力会远比现在有限，最为清晰地塑造并界定2 1 世纪的将是其他地区，而不是欧洲。

Certainly, one reason for NATO’s increasing marginalization stems from the behavior of its European members. The problem is not the number of European troops (there are 2 million) nor what Europeans collectively spend on defense ($300 billion a year), but rather how those troops are organized and how that money is spent. With NATO, the whole is far less than the sum of its parts. Critical decisions are still made nationally; much of the talk about a common defense policy remains just that — talk. There is little specialization or coordination. Missing as well are many of the logistical and intelligence assets needed to project military force on distant battlefields. The alliance’s effort in Libya — the poorly conceived intervention, the widespread refusal or inability to participate in actual strike missions, the obvious difficulties in sustaining intense operations — is a daily reminder of what the world’s most powerful military organization cannot accomplish.
当然，北约日益边缘化的一个原因是其欧洲成员国的表现。问题不在于欧洲成员国在北约的量(目前有200 万)，也不在于欧洲各国共同的防御开支( 每年有3 000亿美元)，而是在于如何组织这些军人、如何花这些钱。对北约来说. 无论是军人数量还是防御开支. 总数远小于各成员国相关部分之和。关键的决策仍然由各国政府作出；关于共同防御政策的讨论在很大程度上只停留在讨论上。谈不上专业化，也没有协调可言。将军事力量投放到遥远战场所需的许多后勤保障和情报资源也处于缺失状态。北约在利比亚采取的行动是一次筹划得很糟糕的军事干预，成员国普遍拒绝或无力参与实际的空袭行动，要保持猛烈的军事行动显然存在困难。这次行动在不断提醒人们北约这个全球最重要的军事组织所不能胜任之事。

With the Cold War and the Soviet threat a distant memory, there is little political willingness, on a country-by-country basis, to provide adequate public funds to the military. (Britain and France, which each spend more than 2 percent of their gross domestic products on defense, are two of the exceptions here.) Even where a willingness to intervene with military force exists, such as in Afghanistan, where upward of 35,000 European troops are deployed, there are severe constraints. Some governments, such as Germany, have historically limited their participation in combat operations, while the cultural acceptance of casualties is fading in many European nations.
冷战和苏联威胁都已成为遥远的回忆， 各国没有多少政治意愿向军队提供充足的公共资金。(英国和法国在这方面是个例外，两国各自将国内生产总值2% 以上用于国防。) 即便是在各国愿意实施军事干预的地方，比如部署了超过3. 5 万名欧洲军人的阿富汗，也存在着严重的制约因素。包括德国在内的一些政府向来限制本国参与作战行动， 此外，许多欧洲国家越来越不能接受战争造成的伤亡。

But it would be wrong, not to mention fruitless, to blame the Europeans and their choices alone. There are larger historical forces contributing to the continent’s increasing irrelevance to world affairs.
但是如果把问题只归咎于欧洲各国和它们作出的选择，那将是错误的， 更不要说这样做毫无意义了。欧洲之所以在全球事务上越来越无足轻重，还有一些较大的历史因素在发挥作用。

Ironically, Europe’s own notable successes are an important reason that transatlanticties will matter less in the future. The current euro zone financial crisis should not obscure the historic accomplishment that was the building of an integrated Europe over the past half-century. The continent is largely whole and free and stable. Europe, the principal arena of much 20th-century geopolitical competition, will be spared such a role in the new century — and this is a good thing.
具有讽刺意味的是，欧洲自身取得的巨大成功是导致大西洋两岸的关系未来不那么举足轻重的重要原因。当前欧元区爆发金融融危机不应该掩盖半个世纪来在建立一体化欧洲方面取得的历史性成就。欧洲大陆基本上是一个整体，自由而稳定。欧洲是20世纪地缘政治竞争的主要场所，在新的世纪，它将不会扮演这样的角色.而这是一件好事。

The contrast with Asia could hardly be more dramatic. Asia is increasingly the center of gravity of the world economy; the historic question is whether this dynamism can be managed peacefully. The major powers of Europe — Germany, France and Great Britain — have reconciled, and the regional arrangements there are broad and deep. In Asia, however, China, Japan, India, Vietnam, the two Koreas, Indonesia and others eye one another warily. Regional pacts and arrangements, especially in the political and security realms, are thin. Political and economic competition is unavoidable; military conflict cannot be ruled out. Europeans will play a modest role, at best, in influencing these developments.
欧洲与亚洲的反差大得几乎不能再大了。亚洲日益成为全球经济的重心，重要的问题是， 这样的势头能否得到和平的处理。欧洲大国——德国、法国和英国已经实现了和解， 欧洲的区域性安排广泛而深入。然而在亚洲，中国、日本、印度、越南、朝韩两国、印度尼西亚以及其他国家警惕地关注着彼此。区域性条约和约定，在政治和安全领域尤为缺少。政治和经济竞争元法避免; 军事冲突的可能性不能排除。对于亚洲的这些事态， 欧洲最多只能发挥不大的影响力。