中国加入WTO十年得失

It is almost a decade since China joined the World Trade Organization. Back then, China imported "global order": it absorbed pre-existing, mainly U.S.-designed policies, rules and institutions. It acted rather like a small or medium-sized economy that could only adapt to the international terms of trade. Now China is one of the Big Three, alongside the U.S. and European Union. It is the world's second-largest economy and its leading exporter of goods. It is also the biggest post-crisis contributor to global growth.
中国加入世界贸易组织 (WTO)差不多已经有十年了。当初，中国是进口“全球秩序”：中国吸收了业已存在的、主要是由美国设计的政策、规则和制度。中国当时表现得更像是一个中小型经济体，只能去适应国际贸易条款。如今，中国已经与美国和欧盟比肩，跻身世界三大巨头之列。中国目前是世界第二大经济体，是世界头号商品出口国。金融危机过后，中国还对全球经济的增长作出了最大的贡献。

In line with its growing economic size, Beijing wants to influence international prices and shape global rules. But that will require significant changes in the ways Beijing thinks about economic policy, and Beijing has resisted those changes to date. This creates uncertainty and instability for China and the rest of the world, and has implications for other leaders looking to China to play a constructive role in global economic matters.
为了与中国不断扩大的经济规模相匹配，北京希望对国际价格施加影响，并决定国际规则。然而，这就需要北京对其考虑经济政策的方式做出重大改变，而到目前为止北京抵制做出这种改变。这就为中国和世界其他国家创造了不确定性和不稳定性，并对那些希望中国在全球经济事务中发挥建设性作用的其他国家领导人产生影响。

Global trade issues best reveal China's policy shift, and also its policy dilemma. China's membership of the WTO has been a resounding success. Access to the WTO's rules-based system and dispute-resolution process has defused manifold tensions and smoothed China's rapid integration into the global economy. Beijing also has negotiated bilateral or regional free-trade agreements such as the one with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
全球贸易问题最好地揭示了中国的政策转变，也反映出中国的政策困境。中国加入世贸组织是一个令人瞩目的成就。加入世贸组织以规则为基础的体系和争端解决程序消除了多个方面的紧张关系，并为中国迅速融入全球经济铺平了道路。北京还通过谈判达成了双边或地区性的自由贸易协定，比如与东盟的自贸协定。

But China also has been a conspicuously passive and marginal player in the Doha Round of talks to further liberalize global trade. Its default position is still to react, leaving other big players to take initiatives. And its FTAs tend to be fairly weak. Whereas, for instance, South Korea's FTAs with the U.S. and EU represent comprehensive liberalization in trade between major partners, Beijing's pact with Asean only eliminates tariffs; it hardly, if at all, tackles regulatory barriers to trade in goods and services, investment and public procurement. Other Chinese FTAs, such as its agreement with Pakistan, don't even eliminate most tariffs.
中国领导人对自由化问题一直持更加谨慎的态度。在旨在进一步推动全球贸易自由化的多哈回合谈判上，中国也一直是一个超级被动并且不起眼的参与者。被动等待是中国的默认立场，等着其他重要的参与者提出建议。此外，中国对自由贸易协定的政策力度往往也相当不够。比如，韩国与美国和欧盟的白贸协定包括主要贸易伙伴之间的贸易完全自由化，而北京与东盟的协定只取消了关税；这种程度的协定很难解决货物和服务贸易、投资以及公共采购过程中存在的壁垒。中国其他的自贸协定，比如与巴基斯坦签署的协定，甚至没有取消绝大部分关税。

Meanwhile, China's historic opening to the world economy has stalled since about 2006. There has been paltry unilateral liberalization beyond China's WTO commitments. Anti-liberalization interests—some ministries, regulatory agencies and resurgent state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—have grown more powerful. Despite, or perhaps because of, China's growing clout, it is unwilling to open markets unilaterally and haggles hard over reciprocal concessions.
与此同时，大约从2006年开始，中国具有历史意义的向世界经济开放的步伐一直停滞不前。除了中国加入世贸组织所作的承诺之外，中国几乎没有采取什么单边的自由化措施。反对自由化的利益集团——某些部委、监管机构和复苏的国有企业——已经变得更加强大。尽管可能是由于中国的影响力不断增强，中国并不愿单边开放市场，一直在努力争取到相互的让步。