中国加入WTO十年得失

Beijing's stalled liberalization is also of a piece with greater industrial-policy intervention, aimed to promote a core of about 50 SOEs, mainly in "strategic" manufacturing and resource-based sectors, and a handful of state-owned banks that dominate the financial system. China's response to the global financial crisis—a supercharged fiscal and monetary stimulus—bolstered the public sector and state power at the expense of the far-less-subsidized private sector. Beijing's frequent recourse to command-and-control mechanisms such as price controls to fight inflation makes market reform harder.
北京自由化进程的停滞不前也与更大力度的工业政策干预有关系，这种干预旨在推动大约由50家国有企业组成的“核心”的发展。这些企业主要属于“战略性”制造业和以资源为基础的部门，此外还有几家主导着金融体系的国有银行。中国应对全球金融危机的方式——动力超强的财政和货币刺激计划——扶持了公共部门和政府的实力，却让私人部门为此付出代价，后者得到的补贴要少得多。北京时常求助于“指令加控制”机制的这种做法，比如利用限价措施来抗击通货膨胀，增加了市场改革的难度。

Protectionist trade policy and dirigiste industrial policy meet at several junctions. Export restrictions—most conspicuously on rare-earth metals—have increased. Tax incentives, subsidies and price controls, as well as administrative "guidance" on investment decisions, are used to favor domestic goods over imports. China-specific standards, such as on third-generation mobile phones, can create high compliance costs for foreign enterprises. Services barriers, notably in financial and telecommunication services, have come down very slowly, if at all.
保护主义的贸易政策和计划经济式的工业政策在几个点上汇合到了一起。出口限制——最突出的就是对稀土的出口限制——有所增强。税收奖励、补贴和限价措施以及对投资决定的行政“引导”，都被用于帮助国内产品抵御进口产品。中国特有的标准，比如有关第三代手机的标准，为外国企业创造出高昂的成本。中国消除服务业壁垒的速度假如不是零的话，也是非常缓慢的，特别是在金融业和电信服务业。

Foreign-investment restrictions have been tightened in a range of sectors where SOEs operate, such as iron and steel, petrochemicals, coal, biofuels, news websites, audiovisual and Internet services. Discriminatory government procurement, in the guise of promoting "indigenous innovation," favors domestic companies. Joint-venture and technology-transfer requirements on foreign companies promote national champions in high-speed rail, electric cars and renewable-energy sectors. Finally, "investment nationalism" extends to China's Go Out policy: Resource-based SOEs in particular are buying up foreign assets with cheap capital provided by state-owned banks.
在有国有企业经营的一系列部门，比如钢铁、石化、煤炭、生物燃料、新闻网站、视听和互联网服务部门，针对外国投资的限制有所收紧。差别性的政府采购打着推动“自主创新”的旗号偏袒国内公司。外国企业受到的合资和技术转让的要求导致本土企业在高速铁路、电力汽车和可再生能源部门拔得头筹。最终， “投资民族主义”延伸到中国的“走出去”战略中：尤其是以资源为基础的国有企业，它们正在利用国有银行提供的廉价资本大量买入外国资产。

The problem is that this policy mix is incompatible with global economic leadership at a time when China has little choice but to become a global leader. Beijing can't expect its trading partners to accept indefinitely a flood of Chinese exports without opening its own market to their goods. Hence it is in China's own interests to restrain industrial-policy activism and its protectionist spillover. And it should proceed with "WTO-plus" reforms that move beyond the letter of its accession commitments. It could further reduce applied import tariffs, especially on industrial goods. It should reverse export controls on raw materials and agricultural commodities.
问题在于，中国的这种政策组合与其全球经济领导地位是不协调的，中国目前几乎别无选择，只能成为全球领导者。北京不能指望其贸易伙伴无止境地接受中国出口商品的大量涌入，而中国并不向它们的商品开放市场。因此，遏制工业政策中存在的激进主义和贸易保护主义所带来的副作用是符合中国自身利益的。而且，中国应当继续推进 “超WTO”改革，不仅仅局限于当初加入世贸时所做的承诺。中国可以进一步降低已经实施的进口税，尤其是对工业产品所征收的进口税。中国应当取消对原材料和农业初级产品的出口控制。

China's more substantial challenge is to tackle high trade-related domestic regulatory barriers in goods, services, investment and public procurement. These measures should be hitched firmly to domestic reforms to improve the business climate and to "rebalance" the economy—to make it more consumption- and less investment-oriented, with more freedom for the private sector and less public-sector control.
中国面临的更加重大的挑战在于，中国需要解决商品、服务、投资和公共采购领域存在的与贸易相关的国内监管的高壁垒。这些措施应当与改善商业氛围、 “调整”经济的国内改革密切结合起来——以使经济变得更加注重消费，减少对投资的依赖，同时给予私人部门更多的自由，减少对公共部门的控制。

Most of this wish list is not on Beijing's agenda. Leaders are not minded to curtail industrial policy and proceed with reforms beyond their WTO commitments. The latter would mean not merely liberalizing product markets but also reforming highly controlled markets for factors of production like land and capital and for energy inputs like oil, water and electricity. Those lie at the heart of domestic economics and politics. The reforms China most needs now cut to the core of the Communist Party-government-public sector nexus and its grip on power. It is unlikely to happen soon.
上述意愿中的绝大部分并不在北京的政治议程之上。领导人并不想调整工业政策以及继续推进超出WTO承诺的改革。后者不仅仅意味着放开产品市场，还意味着要改革受到高度控制的生产要素市场（比如土地和资本）和能源市场（比如石油、水资源和电力）。这些市场在国内经济和政治中处于核心位置。这种改革在短期内是不大可能发生的。

The story is not necessarily as grim as might at first appear. Earlier liberalization has left China so deeply integrated into global supply chains that it can't afford to move too far backward on reforms, and Beijing increasingly can't afford to stand still either as it endeavors to deliver steadily rising prosperity. But until it finds a way to break this impasse, China will be limited in its ability to exercise meaningful global leadership. This fact calls for some humility from Chinese leaders who otherwise appear increasingly assertive on the world stage, and for realism from foreign leaders who wish China would exercise a greater leadership role at international forums like the International Monetary Fund, the WTO and the G-20.
情况并不一定会像乍看之下的那么严酷。早期的自由化进程已经使中国深深地融入全球供给链，因此中国无法承受改革的大步倒退。而随着北京力图保持经济稳步持续的繁荣，北京也越来越无法承受停滞不前所要付出的代价。然而，在找到摆脱这种僵局的方法之前，中国担任全球领导者的能力将受到限制。这样的事实要求中国领导人表现出一丝谦逊，否则他们在世界舞台上将被认为越来越武断；而希望中国在国际货币基金组织、世贸组织和20国集团中发挥更重要的领导作用的外国领导人也要现实一些。