马来西亚知名经济学者：中等收入国家陷阱说 是解释还是掩饰？

In recent decades, failure to sustain economic progress has been blamed on a supposed middle-income country (MIC) trap. Such blaming obscures as much as it supposedly explains.

近几十年来，无法维持经济增长常常被归咎为所谓的"中等收入国家陷阱"。这种说辞与其说是解释，不如说是掩饰。

 

The ‘middle-income trap’ fable began as a World Bank story about why upper MICs in Latin America failed to become high-income countries (HICs) after pursuing policies required or prescribed by the Bretton Woods institutions.

“中等收入陷阱说”源自世界银行的一个故事。这个故事讲述了为什么拉丁美洲的第一梯队中等收入国家在遵循了布雷顿森林体系下属机构要求或指定的政策后还是未能成为高收入国家。

 

The 1944 Bretton Woods rules-based international monetary system ended in August 1971 when President Richard Nixon unilaterally repudiated US obligations. This happened after the US Treasury had borrowed heavily from the rest of the world from the 1960s.

1971年8月，尼克松总统单方面拒绝履行美方义务，从而导致基于1944年布雷顿森林协定的国际货币体系瓦解。此前，从20世纪60年代起，美国财政部就大举向世界其他国家借债。

 

The US government’s ‘exorbitant privilege’ of ‘spending well beyond its means’ has continued despite the resulting international monetary ‘non-system’. Continuing acceptance of the US dollar, or ‘greenback’, as the virtual world currency has enabled its Treasury to borrow internationally at low cost.

尽管直接导致国际货币体系瓦解，美国政府却继续保留着“超前消费”的“特权地位”。全球持续接受美元作为虚拟的世界货币，让美国财政部可以低成本向世界各国借款。

 

This has enabled the US to maintain massive trade and current account deficits, and a military presence in much of the world, despite its huge, but still growing fiscal and trade deficits. The US exorbitant privilege seems to have been sustained by its ‘soft power’ and unassailable military superiority.

尽管美国的财政和贸易赤字巨大且不断增长，美国来自各国的借款让其可以维持海量贸易额和经常账户赤字，以及在全球很多地区的军事存在。美国的特权地位似乎一直由其“软实力”和不容置疑的军事优势维持着。

 

Facing ‘stagflation’ – economic stagnation with inflation – US Fed chair Paul Volcker raised interest rates sharply from 1980. This soon killed US inflation, but also Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ legacy from the 1930s.

由于面临停滞性通货膨胀（经济停滞和通货膨胀并存），时任美联储主席保罗·沃尔克从1980年开始大幅上调利率。这很快就遏制住了美国的通货膨胀，但也让20世纪30年代罗斯福新政的遗产荡然无存。

 

With inflation high, real interest rates seemed low despite high nominal interest rates in the developing world. With growth high in the global South in the 1970s, borrowing to sustain investments, even from abroad, remained attractive.

在高通胀下，发展中国家的名义利率很高但实际利率却似乎很低。20世纪70年代，对正在高速发展的南半球国家而言，借款甚至举外债来维持投资仍然很有吸引力。

 

But US interest rate hikes soon triggered fiscal and sovereign debt crises in many countries: Poland in 1981 was followed by various Latin American, African and other developing economies.

但是美国的大幅加息却引发了许多国家的财政和主权债务危机：先是波兰在1981年暴发危机，然后是拉美、非洲等其他发展中经济体。

 

 

 

 

Facing rising interest rates, many governments could no longer service accumulated debt, let alone borrow to invest more. Instead, they had to pursue contractionary monetary and fiscal policies domestically, causing economic stagnation.

面临利率上涨，多国政府无力偿还累积债务，更别提继续借款来投资。因此，他们只能在国内采用紧缩的货币和财政政策，从而导致经济停滞。

 

With Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan demanding such macroeconomic policies, the Washington-based Bretton Woods institutions soon prescribed them, ending the post-Second World War Keynesian ‘Golden Age’.

当时，英国首相撒切尔夫人和美国总统里根想推行宏观经济改革，华盛顿的布雷顿森林体系下属机构就迅速制定新规，从此终结了二战后凯恩斯主义的“黄金年代”。

 

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) demanded contractionary stabilisation policies to qualify for short-term credit facilities. World Bank structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) typically required economic liberalisation and privatisation for longer-term financing.

国际货币基金组织（IMF）敦促各国紧缩财政稳定经济，以满足短期信贷服务的条件。世界银行结构调整计划（SAPs）通常要求满足经济自由化和私有化条件才能提供长期信贷服务。

 

The Bank also advocated more export-orientation and foreign investment. When paid by Japan’s government, the Bank celebrated its post-war industrial boom as a ‘miracle’, a new model for emulation. But this soon ended with its demise due to the US-demanded overvalued yen and its ill-advised financial ‘Big Bang’.

世界银行还提倡各国发展出口导向型经济，吸引外资。在收到日本政府的还款后，世界银行盛赞日本战后的工业繁荣是一个“奇迹”，是各国效法的新榜样。但由于日元在美国的要求下大幅升值加上不明智的金融“大爆炸”导致日本经济崩盘，这一盛景也迅速终结。

 

 

 

 

Latin American and other vulnerable economies lost over a decade from the 1980s while African economies lost a quarter century. Low-interest official Japanese credit initially mainly went to Southeast Asia, while South Asia took on less foreign debt.

自20世纪80年代以来，拉丁美洲和其他脆弱的经济体的发展停滞了超十年之久，而非洲经济体则停滞了四分之一个世纪。日本低息贷款一开始主要流向了东南亚，南亚国家借的外债则较少。

 

Stabilisation and SAP conditionalities undermined Latin America’s modest industrialisation, which also prevented the region from recovering strongly until the new century. But their economies had not been sufficiently liberalised for ‘neoliberals’ despite turning more to foreign trade and investment from the 1980s.

要求经济稳定的条件和结构调整贷款的条件损害了拉丁美洲的适度工业化进程，也阻止了该地区的经济在新世纪前强势复苏。尽管拉丁美洲从20世纪80年代起更多地转向外贸和外资，但是由于“新自由主义”思潮，拉美经济体一直没有实现充分的自由化。

 

Prosperous economies became more protectionist, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis. But developing countries were told to open up even more despite shrinking export markets.

与此同时，发达经济体开始采用更多的贸易保护主义政策，尤其在2008年全球金融危机之后。但是发展中国家却被告知要进一步对外开放，尽管他们的出口市场不断萎缩。

 

But with globalisation over, even East Asia can no longer rely on export growth. Also, it is difficult to turn away from export-oriented production, especially as earlier trade deal commitments cannot be unilaterally repudiated.

随着全球化走向终结，甚至连东亚国家也不能再依赖出口来实现经济增长。但是，要放弃出口导向性生产也很困难，尤其在早期的贸易协定不能单方面违约的情况下。

 

In many prosperous economies, workers captured some of their productivity gains. But the oft-heard claim that productivity increases lag behind wage rises usually serves employers. In most ‘labour-surplus’ developing countries, wages remain low.

在许多发达经济体，工人可以获得部分生产力收益。但是人们常常听到的生产率增长落后于工资增长的声音往往是为雇主服务的。在大多数“劳动力富余”的发展中国家，工资依然维持在较低水平。

 

As in South America early this century, progressive redistribution has often accelerated, rather than subverted growth. Common claims that such redistribution is bad for growth must be critically reconsidered. After all, progressive redistribution sustained growth in post-war Europe.

而在本世纪初的南美地区，进步的再分配机制往往加快而不是阻止了经济增长。必须批判性地看待那些认为这种再分配有损经济增长的普遍说法。毕竟，正是这种进步的再分配机制让战后的欧洲保持经济增长。

 

 

 

 

The ‘middle-income trap’ argument claims MICs cannot sustain rapid economic progress. Supposed reasons vary with policy and ideological biases, as ostensible structural, cultural, political, behavioural or governance causes typically reflect such prejudices.

“中等收入陷阱”一说认为中等收入国家无法维持高速的经济增长。其理由因政策和意识形态的偏见有所不同，所谓的结构、文化、政治、行为或治理方面的理由通常都能反映出这样的偏见。

 

Recent narratives have proclaimed the need to ‘graduate’ from secondary to tertiary economic activities. Modern services growth is supposedly needed to sustain progress to become HICs.

最近有理论声称有必要从第二第三产业“毕业”了，现在必须发展现代服务业才能维持经济增长从而成为高收入国家。

 

Another popular argument has been that progressive redistribution has subverted growth. But it is now uncontroversial that progressive redistribution was crucial for sustaining growth in post-war Europe.

另一个流行的理论是进步的再分配机制阻碍了经济的增长。但是现在毋庸置疑的是，进步的再分配机制对于战后欧洲保持经济增长至关重要。

 

Discretionary state powers have undoubtedly been abused for political patronage and self-aggrandisement. Clientelism plagues many societies, undermining needed state interventions. But we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater.

毫无疑问，国家自由裁量权以政治任命和自我扩张的形式被滥用。庇护主义在许多社会肆虐，削弱了必要的政府干预。但我们不应良莠不分一起舍弃。

 

History suggests the best way to overcome the ‘middle income trap’ would be to implement appropriate investment and technology policies. Selective policies are needed to promote growth, not only of manufacturing, but also of high-end services, as well as safe, nutritious and affordable food supplies.

历史表明，克服“中等收入陷阱”的最好方式应该是实施适当的投资和技术政策。需要选择性地采取政策来促进经济发展，不只是制造业和高端服务业的发展，还有安全、有营养、价格实惠的农产品行业的发展。

 

But all this is not going to happen spontaneously. Reforms need to be deliberately elaborated and sequenced through various interventions as part of well-designed, coherent and sustained initiatives.

但所有这些不会自行发生。我们需要精心策划，通过各种干预措施来有序推进改革，并保证方案的周密性、连贯性和持续性。