失业救济金让失业者更加理智

　　Paying people to stay out of work is an example of that increasingly familiar phenomenon, "moral hazard", but moral hazard can be more fearsome in the theorist's imagination than it is in reality. Does unemployment benefit really encourage people to duck work? Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that it does: increases in benefits have repeatedly been linked with longer periods between jobs.

　　为不工作的人支付报酬是"道德风险"的一个例子，人们对于这种现象越来越熟悉。但理论家想象中的道德风险，可能比现实中更为可怕。失业救济真的鼓励人们逃避工作吗？不幸地是，有证据表明确实如此：在很多情况下，失业救济金的上升与两次就业之间的间隔时期延长存在关系。

　　But new research from Raj Chetty, a young Berkeley economist, suggests that moral hazard may not be why more generous benefits seem to lead to more unemployment. Chetty realised that unemployment benefit does not merely pay people to stay out of work; it also protects them from having to rush into an unsuitable job. It is nothing to celebrate if unemployed engineers cannot afford to spend three months finding a job for which they are qualified, but are forced to work as estate agents to put food on the table. A longer gap between jobs is sometimes preferable.

　　但是，加州大学伯克利分校年轻的经济学家拉吉?切迪(Raj Chetty)的最新研究显示，道德风险可能并非更慷慨的失业救济导致更多失业的原因。切迪认为，失业救济不仅为失业者提供了收入，同时使他们免于匆忙从事一份不合适自己的工作。如果失业的工程师花不起3个月的时间寻找称职的工作，而是被迫去当一名房地产经纪人来维持生计，那也没有什么值得庆贺的。在某些 情况下，两次就业之间的间隔时期延长是可取的。