正文
失业救济金让失业者更加理智
这是一个有趣的理论,但是将道德风险与手头有一些现金可花的效应区别开相当困难。切迪研究了美国失业保险制度的明显改变,将各州的制度进行比较,或研究制度改变时的状况。一个具有提示性的发现是:当失业救济金增加时,并非所有人都对此留恋不舍。美国失业者的救济金中值为200美元,他们不太可能借到很多钱,但有些人失业时,在银行有大量的存款。切迪发现,那些有存款的人在救济金更高的时候,不愿意失业太长时间,而那些没有多少存款的人,则愿意等上更长的时间。这表明,那些自己没有现金储备的人正利用失业救济,让自己有充足的时间去寻找合适的工作。
Of course, there may be many differences between people with savings and those without, so this merely suggests that Chetty is on to something. But there are other clues - for instance, Chetty and two colleagues looked at the system in Austria, where severance pay is due to anyone employed for more than three years. By looking at - for example - a factory closure in which lots of staff are fired simultaneously, they could treat severance pay almost as a randomised experiment. Those lucky enough to get severance pay spent more time looking for a new job, despite the fact that severance pay provides no direct incentive to stay out of work.
当然,有存款的人与没有存款的人的情况可能有很多不同,因此这只是表明,切迪发现了一些东西。但还有其他一些线索,比如,切迪和两位同事研究了奥地利的制度,该国任何就业三年以上的雇员都有解雇费。举例来说,在观察一家工厂倒闭、大量工人同时被裁掉时,他们可能把解雇费作为一种随机实验。那些足够幸运的家 伙利用解雇费来花费更多的时间寻找一份新工作,尽管事实上,解雇费并没有直接鼓励人们不工作。
Unemployment benefit does encourage unemployment in the short term; but that may be no bad thing.
短期内,失业救济确实鼓励了失业,但这可能不是坏事。
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