经济学人下载:美国遇史上最严重黑客入侵,幕后黑手系俄罗斯?(3)

Yet this effort to stamp norms onto a covert and chaotic arena of competition has been unsuccessful. For one thing, it is not always simple to define what is “honourable”, in Mr Hayden’s parlance, and what is not. If stealing a policy document is kosher, why not a vaccine? The line between espionage and subversion is also blurred: is Russia stealing emails to understand American policy, or to publish them later? It is not always clear until after the fact. 

然而，这种将规范强加于隐蔽而混乱的竞争舞台的努力却没有成功。首先，用海登的话来说，界定入侵行为是否“光荣”并不总是那么简单。如果界定窃取政策文件为正当活动，那为什么不可以窃取疫苗文件呢？间谍活动和破坏活动之间的界限也很模糊：俄罗斯窃取电子邮件是为了了解美国政策，还是为了稍后公布它们？直到事后才清楚。

Most so-called cyber-attacks are simply espionage. But espionage conducted over computer networks has enabled intelligence gathering on a scale that was previously impossible. Though America has been as much a beneficiary of this intelligence revolution as it has been a victim, it has grown less tolerant in recent years. American views of “what’s allowed in cyberspace” have changed since the OPM breach five years ago, says Max Smeets of the Centre for Security Studies in Zurich. Such large-scale espionage “would be now at the top of the list of operations that they would deem as unacceptable,” he suggests. 

大多数所谓的网络攻击只是间谍活动。但通过计算机网络进行的间谍活动使情报收集达到了前所未有的规模。尽管美国既是这场情报革命的受益者，也是受害者，但近年来美国的容忍度有所下降。苏黎世安全研究中心的马克斯•斯梅茨称，自从五年前人事管理局被攻破以来，美国对“网络空间准入什么”的看法已经发生了变化。他表示，美国目前认为如此大规模的间谍活动“将是不可接受的首要行动”。

Yet forbidding something is different from stopping it. “Deterrence is mostly irrelevant in an intelligence contest,” writes Joshua Rovner of the American University in Washington, a scholar-in-residence at the NSA in 2018-19. “No combination of threats and promises will stop a rival intelligence service from collecting information.” Sturdier defences are needed. 

然而，禁止与阻止是不同的。美国国家安全局2018-19年度的驻校学者、华盛顿美国大学的约书亚•罗夫纳写道：“威慑在情报竞赛中大多无关紧要。”。“任何威胁和承诺的结合都不能阻止敌对情报机构收集信息。”我们需要更坚固的防御。