经济学人下载:日本灾难,钚与米奇鼠

The plant is so woefully damaged that TEPCO officials cannot say when the crisis will be over. Levels of radiation have mostly been subsiding, though unevenly spread. But reports on March 31st revealed that radiation in a village 40km away exceeded criteria for evacuation and the UN’s nuclear watchdog suggested the government might widen the 20km evacuation zone. All this has compounded worries that the area round the plant may remain unsafe for years.

核电站被破坏的非常严重，东京电力公司当局不能说明危机什么时候能结束。尽管辐射在不均衡扩散，大多辐射水平还是稳定了下来。但是3月31日的报告显示：40公里外的辐射量超过了疏散标准，联合国的国际原子能机构建议日本政府应当将疏散区扩大20公里。这些都加剧了核电站附近区域可能在接下来的数年内都不会安全的忧虑。

There is plenty of blame to go around. TEPCO wrongly measured radiated waters in one of the turbine halls at 10m times normal level, rather than the still-alarming 100,000 times. Subcontractors working for TEPCO reportedly complained about the safety of their workers on site. Three electricians accidentally stepped into a dangerous puddle on March 24th. In one sign of uNPReparedness, the gauge that measured the radioactivity of water afterwards could not go higher than 1,000 millisieverts an hour, about the level at which radiation becomes an immediate threat to health.

对于东京电力公司的指责不绝于耳。东京电力公司错误地测量了其中一个汽机房中的放射性水的辐射水平是正常水平的10,000,000倍，而不是仍在警戒的100,000倍。根据传闻，为东京电力公司工作的转包商抱怨他们在工地的工作人员的安全问题。3月24日，三名电工误入了一个危险的水坑。在准备不足的一个迹象中，测量完水中的放射性之后的测量器无法显示比1，000毫西弗特更高的数值，而在这一水平下辐射会直接影响到人的健康。

Tensions between TEPCO and the government of Naoto Kan have risen since the prime minister installed crisis managers inside the utility’s head office. Privately, officials have suggested TEPCO may have been slow to use seawater to cool the reactors because it wanted to save its plant—though the company denies this. Publicly, Mr Kan has lambasted the company’s tsunami-preparedness. Koichiro Gemba, a cabinet minister, has left open the possibility that TEPCO would be nationalised, though this was perhaps to reassure voters in his Fukushima district that they would be adequately compensated. Other officials were non-committal about state intervention, but TEPCO shares have fallen by over 75% since March 11th.

东京电力公司和菅直人政府的紧张关系自从首相安插危机管理小队进入电力公司总部就不断升级。东京电力公司出于拯救设备的想法——尽管公司不会承认这一点——而使用海水来冷却反应堆，危机管理组官员私下里建议东京电力公司放缓这种做法。而公开的，菅直人谴责电力公司在预防海啸方面做的不完善。内阁阁员玄叶光一郎保留了东京电力公司国有化的可能性，这也可能是他通过保证给福岛地区选民充分的补偿来安抚选民的做法。其他的官员没有对国家是否会干预发表意见，但是东京电力公司的股价从3月11日起已经下跌了75%.

Outside experts say that repeated flaws in the company’s nuclear operations have denuded its board of specialists in atomic power. Mr Shimizu is the third successive president to have been hit by a nuclear accident. “This company is really rotten to the core,” says Kenichi Ohmae, a management consultant and former nuclear engineer. He blames TEPCO for storing too much spent fuel on the site; for placing too many reactors in the same place (there are six in the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant and seven in a nuclear complex on an earthquake fault-line in Niigata); and for not having enough varied sources of power.

外界专家认为：东京电力公司在核作业方面一而再再而三的错误已经剥夺了他们在原子能方面的专家外衣。清水正孝连续三届成功当选总裁已经被这场核事故终止。管理顾问及前核工程师大前研一认为：“这家公司真是烂到家了。” 他责怪东京电力公司在工地上储存了太多的废燃料；同一地点架设了太多反应堆（福岛第一核电站有六个反应堆，处于地震断层线的新鸿的一个核设施里有七个核反应堆）；以及它没有足够多样化的发电方法。

But the problems run deeper than TEPCO. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) oversees the regulator and is responsible for safety issues. But it also promotes the nuclear industry. Reportedly, Mr Kan is considering altering this. Nuclear scientists, says Mr Ohmae, are mostly sponsored by utilities, compromising their independence. He describes them as “Christmas-tree decorations” on government safety commissions.

但是东京电力公司的问题远不止这些。日本经济产业省（MEIT）监督管理者并对安全问题负责。但是这也推动了核工业的发展。菅直人公开表示要改变这一机制。大前研一先生说，核科学家大多受到电力公司的赞助，这会损害他们的独立性。在政府安委员会里，大前研一先生把核科学家们描述成“圣诞树上的装饰品”