经济学人下载:证券化 重新启动

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Securitisation
证券化

It's back
重新启动

Once a cause of the financial world's problems, securitisation is now part of the solution
证券化曾经是导致金融危机的因素之一，如今却能帮助解决金融难题

GIVEN their role in the 2008 meltdown, and their subsequent branding as toxic sludge, it is not surprising that securitised financial products have had a quiet few years.
鉴于2008年经济危机时所扮演的角色，以及随后被贴上的有毒污泥的标签，证券化金融产品这几年的表现并不出乎人的意料。

Yet the transformation of mortgages, credit-card debt and other recurring cashflows into new marketable securities is enjoying something of a resurgence.
然而抵押贷款、信用卡债务和其他一些循环的现金流向新的可交易证券的转变目前正在振兴。

Once apparently destined for the financial history books, the alphabet soup of ABSs, MBSs, CLOs and others had a bumper year in 2013. More growth is expected this year.
尽管曾经有过惨痛的经历，但是资产担保证券、抵押贷款证券和贷款抵押债券以及其他许多以字母简称命名的证券在2013年却大获丰收。据预测，今年还会继续增长。

Not everybody is thrilled.
并不是所有人都对此满心欢喜。

Some observers argue that the risks securitisation poses are too grave.
一些观察家称证券化带来的风险会非常严重。

But its revival should be welcomed, for it is probably essential to continued economic recovery, particularly in Europe.
但是尽管如此,重新启动证券化还是众望所归，因为这对于经济的进一步复苏很可能是必需的，尤其是对于欧洲国家而言。

Use carefully
谨慎实行

In its simplest form, securitisation is straightforward and beneficial.
单纯来看，证券化比较直截了当并且有着诸多优势。

For example, a carmaker expecting lots of monthly payments from customers who have taken out financing can get investors to fund its business more cheaply by selling them its claim to those payments.
例如，那些每个月从办理了汽车贷款的消费者那里获得贷款支付的汽车制造商可以通过变卖这些款项的债权而让投资者以更低的代价进行投资。

A bank on the receiving end of mortgage repayments or credit-card receivables can do something similar: bundle the loans up and sell them, or use them as collateral to get funding, which it can then use to issue more loans.
按揭还款或者信用卡应收账款的收款银行可以效仿此番做法：将贷款集中起来卖掉，或者把他们当作抵押款使用以获得投资资金，这样一来，他们就能继续放贷。

This boosts both credit and growth.
这样不仅能够提升信用还能够促进经济增长。

Used recklessly, though, securitisation can be dangerous.
然而一旦使用不慎，证券化也会带来危险。

It fuelled the catastrophic boom in American subprime mortgages.
之前，它曾刺激了美国次级抵押贷款的繁荣增长，但其影响随后被证明是灾难性的。

Some banks, aware that home loans would be sliced, diced, repackaged and sold on, gave up even cursory checks on their borrowers' creditworthiness.
部分银行意识到住房贷款将会被分解、重组和转卖，因而对贷款者信誉哪怕是最粗略的核查都放弃了。

Investors piled in blindly, snapping up supposedly safe tranches of bundled-up debt that proved to be anything but.
投资者们纷纷盲目涌入投资，抢购那批所谓的安全捆绑资金，但事实上这些资金并不如想象中那么优良。

The boom turned to bust and bail-outs.
这股投资热潮进而转向诸多破产，市场急需解救措施。

Yet structured finance cannot bear sole responsibility for the crisis.
然而结构化的金融业并不是经济危机的唯一祸根。

It was more the conduit for irrational financial exuberance than its cause.
与其说它是经济危机的根源不如说是它助了金融业的非理性繁荣一臂之力。

Lax lending standards in boom times predate the emergence of securitisation by several centuries at least.
在金融业繁荣时期实施宽松的借贷政策使得证券化的兴起提前了至少几个世纪。

Most structured products performed well through the crisis, with the notable exception of those related to American residential mortgages.
大多数结构化产品在经济危机期间仍然表现良好，除了那些与美国住房抵押贷款有关的一些例外。

Defaults in Europe remained low despite the recession.
欧洲国家的债务违约情况并没有受经济危机的影响而明显加深。

And although there are still risks, securitisation should be safer in the future than in the past because of new, post-crisis regulations to reduce the danger of excesses.
尽管风险仍然存在，但比起过去证券化在将来应该会相对较安全，因为危机过后重新制定的金融管理政策有利于减小过度放贷的可能性。

The principle that the party creating a new security needs to retain some exposure to the underlying credit should help ensure that underwriting standards do not get too slack.
产生新的有价证券的一方必须保留能证明其潜在信用的相关文件这一条例应该能够确保保险业管理政策不至于太过松弛。

That will hamper the desirable transferring of risk but, given recent history, it is probably prudent to put a little sand in the gears.
这将会限制风险的直接转移，但是，鉴于之前的经验，防患于未然可能会比较明智。

Some of the Kafkaesque structures spawned by securitisation—such as collateralised debt obligations that invested in other CDOs that themselves invested in MBSs—have been made prohibitively difficult to recreate.
由证券化引起的一些奇怪结构—例如将债务抵押债券投资到其他的债务抵押债券，而这些获得投资的债务抵押债券本身则又投资到抵押支付债券—已经被限制形成。

That is also sensible: whereas simple securitisation should be welcomed back, the over-engineered versions that rendered the financial system needlessly opaque should not.
这一做法也是很理智的:尽管单纯的证券化回归应该受到欢迎，而那些太过凸显投资者个人利益并会致使金融系统变得迟钝的投资方式则不该受到期许。

Europe stands to benefit most from securitisation's return. Lenders across Europe are under pressure to improve the ratio of capital they hold to loans made.
从证券化的回归之中受益最大的仍然是欧洲国家。整个欧洲的国家都面临巨大的压力，它们都急需提高资金持有量对贷款额的比例。

One way of doing this is to stop extending credit, which is, unfortunately, what many banks have done.
解决此问题的途径之一是停止放贷，但遗憾的是，很多银行已经开始这样做了。

If they instead slimmed themselves through securitisation, by bundling and repackaging loans and selling them to outside investors such as insurance firms or asset managers, they could lend more money to credit-starved companies.
如果它们是通过集中和重组贷款并转卖给外部投资者诸如保险公司或者资产管理公司这种证券化方式来向外贷款的话，那么它们就可以向资金极度短缺的公司以更大幅度放贷。

That would have the added benefit of spreading risk away from wobbly banks.
这样做的额外好处是可以将风险从经营状况不佳的银行转移到其他地方。

Securitisation certainly has a black mark against it, but it is far too useful to be banished for good.
证券化的回归当然会面临诸多困难，但是它的自身优势使得其不可能被永久弃用。

Almost all financial innovations, from the humble mortgage to the joint-stock company, have had to re-establish their reputations after a bust at some point in their history.
几乎所有的金融改革，从不起眼的抵押贷款到合股企业都曾经经历破产然后重塑形象。

Society benefited from their eventual rehabilitation—as it most probably will from the revival of securitisation.
而等它们最终成功恢复名声，社会将能从中收益—正如很可能从证券化的回归中受益一样。