经济学人下载:自由贸易 倾斜的海运

Free exchange
自由贸易

Tilted marine
倾斜的海运

New techniques show the damage done by subsidies at the heart of global trade
新方法表明对航运业的补贴具有危害性

THERE is no better symbol of the benefits of globalization than the container ship. More than 9 billion tonnes of goods and materials were transported by sea in 2012, with trade helping to lift global growth rates. An ever-expanding web of links connects rich and poor; developing countries now account for around 60% of seaborne trade. But ships also show the rotten side of trade: protectionism. In 2006 China enacted a “Long and Medium-Term Plan” to enlarge its shipping industry by 2015. It has been successful (see left-hand chart). New research shows its attempts to tilt markets may be having a bigger impact than previously thought.
没有什么比集装箱船更能代表全球化带来的益处。2012年，超过90亿吨的物资通过海运运输，这些贸易加快了全球增长速度。发达地区与贫困地区之间的联系不断扩大，如今发展中国家占据了海运贸易的60%。然而，船舶市场依然显现了贸易的消极一面：保护主义。2006年，中国颁布了一个截至2015年的以鼓励航运业为目的的“中长期规划”。这个计划目前看来是成功的（见左图）。近期调查显示，中国试图倾斜市场的行为可能比想象中更具冲击力。

Protectionism in shipping is centuries old. In a 1905 study* Royal Meeker, an American economist, explained how a system of subsidies developed under Elizabeth I. Rewards were based on tonnage of ship, and included “bounties” paid to fishing boats heading for the North Sea in search of herring. Adam Smith provided an early economic analysis in “The Wealth of Nations”, lamenting: “It has, I am afraid, been too common for vessels to fit out for the sole purpose of catching, not the fish, but the bounty.” The handouts distorted the shipbuilding industry, resulting in an oversize fishing fleet and a misallocation of resources.
航运业保护主义已经有一百年的历史了。美国经济学家罗亚尔·米克在1905年做的一项研究解释了伊丽莎白一世在任期间的补贴制度是怎样制定的。补贴是基于船舶吨位确定的，包括对驶往北海捕获鲱鱼的渔船提供的奖金。亚当·斯密在《国富论》中给出了一个早期的经济分析，他感叹道：“装配船舶的唯一目的恐怕不是捕鱼，而是为了得到津贴。”救济金（补贴）扭曲了造船业，引致了捕捞船队过于庞大、资源配置不当。

Far from avoiding the distortion Smith spotted, governments have been keen to nurture it. The early logic was military. A strong merchant fleet meant lots of boats that could be commandeered during times of war. One way to bolster shipping has been to grant lucrative contracts for postal delivery: Britain's Cunard lines benefited hugely from such a deal in the 1830s. Another method, used by both America and Japan in the early 1900s, was easy finance, in the form of cut-price government loans.
与斯密所倡导的避免市场扭曲理论相悖甚远，各国政府一直以来都热衷于提供补贴。早期，对航运业提供补贴被认为可以为军事服务。一个强大的商船队意味着战争时期可以征用更多的船舶。鼓励航运业的一种方法是允许签订利润丰厚的邮递合同：英国的丘纳德航运公司在1830年的一笔邮递交易中获利甚多。另一种方法是以廉价政府贷款的形式为航运公司提供便捷的融资，这也是19世纪初美国和日本采取的政策。

Modern shipping subsidies are used to build economic heft rather than military might. Governments like shipping due to the knock-on effects of a booming yard. Modern ships are huge (up to 400m long) and include up to 30,000 parts. Assembling them is labour-intensive, and so is making the parts that outside suppliers provide to the shipyards. A recent report by America's Maritime Administration estimated that more than 107,000 people work in the country's heavily protected shipyards. Adding in the companies supporting the yards, and the shops and services that support these workers, the total ran to 400,000, an employment “multiplier” of 4. So, the idea is, by helping shipping a government indirectly supports workers in many other industries.
现在的航运补贴更多的则是为了加强经济实力，而非军事力量。各国政府青睐航运业是因为建造船厂能够带来一系列连锁效应。现代船舶船型巨大（可达400米长），可囊括零部件多达3万个。供应商制造向船厂提供的零部件，以及组装这些部件都是劳动密集型的工作。根据美国海事局最近做的一份报告估计，超过10.7万人在政府强烈保护的造船厂工作。加上这些造船厂的供应商，以及这些工人产生的商品和服务消费需求，总共拉动了40万人的就业，就业乘数为4。因此，这样一来通过加强航运业，政府间接拉动了其他行业的就业。

Yet economists' views on subsidies have hardened over time. China's policy provides subsidies both for the construction of ships themselves and for the building or expansion of shipyards. These interferences can distort trade, resulting in inefficient production. In deciding whether a subsidy flouts trade rules the World Trade Organisation (WTO) uses a “price gap” approach. The idea is simple: if a country is producing and selling something at a big discount to what others are charging, there is probably something fishy going on.
然而，经济学家们对政府补贴的态度越来越坚定。中国的政策是同时对建造船舶和建造、扩大船坞提供补贴。这些干预会扭曲贸易，导致生产效率低下。世界贸易组织（WTO）用“价格差”的方法判定一项补贴是否违反贸易规则。道理很简单：如果一国生产并出售某产品的价格远低于其他国家的要价，这其中可能就有问题。

Price gaps provide a quick warning system, but are a poor way to judge the full extent of subsidies, according to a 2013 book by Usha and George Haley, of West Virginia University and the University of New Haven. It is a static approach, ignoring how demand for each shipyard's differentiated products varies over time. It also fails to account for variations in efficiency. Whereas Chinese workers may be relatively cheap, large South Korean or Japanese shipyards exploit economies of scale that smaller Chinese yards cannot. The balance of all these factors, in addition to subsidies, should influence a shipyard's costs and prices.
根据乌莎（西弗吉尼亚大学）和乔治·海利（纽黑文大学）在2013年发表的一本书，价格差提供了一个直观警示机制，但它却不能很好的判断补贴的真实程度。价格差是个静态方法，忽视了每个造船厂的不同产品的需求随时间的变动。并且它也不能解释生产效率的变动。虽然中国的劳动力可能相对更廉价，但韩国和日本的大型造船厂相对中国的小型造船厂拥有规模效应。除了补贴，这些因素的综合作用也影响着造船厂的成本和定价。

Recognising this, a 2014 working paper by Myrto Kalouptsidi of Princeton University provides a new way to spot subsidies and measure their impact. Using detailed quarterly data on factors like a shipyard's age, size, capacity and staffing levels Ms Kalouptsidi estimates cost functions—the relationship between a yard's output and its cost of production—for 192 yards across China, Japan, South Korea and Europe. By analysing data between 2001 and 2012, she can isolate the impact of China's 2006 policy.
鉴于上述原因，普林斯顿大学的学者Myrto Kalouptsidi于2014年在一份研究手稿中提出了一种考察补贴并衡量其影响的新方法。使用造船厂年龄、规模、容量、员工配备水平等因素的详细季度数据，Kalouptsidi估计出了中国、日本、韩国以及欧洲的192个造船厂的成本函数（造船厂生产的成本与产出之间的关系）。通过分析2001年到2012年的数据，她排除了中国2006年鼓励航运业的政策的影响。

The results are striking. A simple price-gap approach shows that Chinese ships cost 7.3% less than rivals'. Controlling for quality differences—Chinese ships are seen as lower quality and so should be around 3.5% cheaper, even in the absence of subsidies—gives a 4% gap, hardly justification for WTO rage. But Ms Kalouptsidi's estimates show this is just part of the story. Government help artificially lowered Chinese firms' costs by between 15-20%. The aid will have included explicit subsidies and hidden benefits, such as tolerating losses at state-owned yards. China's market share jumped as the policy was introduced (see right-hand chart).
结果是惊人的。简单的价格差方法显示中国船舶的生产成本相对其竞争对手低7.3%。考虑质量差异—中国船舶被认为质量低下，即使没有补贴也应该便宜将近3.5%—最终产生了4%的价格差，这并不足以让WTO动怒。但是Kalouptsidi的估测表明，这仅仅是表面现象。政府人为地援助中国企业将成本降低了15%到20%。这些援助包括显性补贴和隐性福利，例如容许国有造船厂亏损经营。自从这种政策出台，中国的市场份额显著跃升。

As in Smith's day, this has shifted resources. By comparing the costs and productivity of the shipyards in her sample, Ms Kalouptsidi forecasts how the market might have developed in the absence of China's subsidies. Her analysis points to a big resource reallocation: absent the meddling, Japan's market share would have been around 30 percentage points higher. Since many South Korean or Japanese yards are more efficient than China's, it means that the true cost of ship production may well have risen. Bloated by subsidy, China's yards have turned out a surfeit of vessels, often poorly matched to customers' demands.
如同在斯密的时代，这种政策转移了资源。Kalouptsidi女士通过比较她选取的样本中的不同造船厂的成本和生产率，预测出了在中国不提供补贴的情况下市场的发展状况。她分析提出了一个大幅变动的资源重置：如果没有干预，日本的市场份额应该比现在高出大概30%。由于许多韩国和日本的造船厂比中国生产效率更高，这意味着船舶的真实生产成本可能已经抬高了。受到补贴的鼓励，中国造船厂过度生产，常常与客户需求不匹配。

All this suggests the WTO and other trade-watchers may need to refine their tools to help identify the full extent of subsidies. Other markets are ripe for this kind of analysis. The global glut of solar panels owes much to protectionism, according to the Hayleys' book. Steel markets are badly distorted by subsidies to producers, says the WTO. Subsidised solar panels being exported aboard subsidised ships made from subsidised steel show just how far those that seek free trade have to go.
这些都表明了WTO和其他的贸易研究者可能需要改进方法，以更好地判断补贴的严重程度。其他市场已经具备使用上述分析方法的条件。根据海利的书，太阳能电池板在全球范围内的供给过剩是由保护主义造成的。WTO认为，钢材市场因为生产补贴而严重扭曲。用补贴的钢材建造补贴的船舶，运输出口补贴的太阳能电池板，看来那些追求自由贸易的人还有很长一段路要走。