经济学人下载:亚太贸易协定 美国与日本

The United States, Japan and trade
亚太贸易协定：美国与日本

Don't treat trade as a weapon
别将贸易协定作为武器

An Asian-Pacific trade deal looks within reach, but politicians should stop seeing it as a way to contain China
亚太贸易协定似乎触手可及,但政客们应该停止将其视为牵制中国的一种方式

GOOD news out of Washington is rare. Last week congressional leaders agreed on a bipartisan bill which, if passed, would for the first time in years give the president “fast-track” authority when negotiating trade deals. The bill would be a boost for the prospects of a huge trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), binding America with 11 economies (including Japan but not China) around the Pacific rim. Now, as if on cue, come welcome signals about the TPP itself. As Japan's prime minister, Shinzo Abe, prepared to head to Washington for a much-anticipated trip including an invitation to address a joint session of Congress (see article), he claimed that America and Japan were close to agreement over their bilateral terms—on which the whole TPP deal hinges.
从华盛顿传来了罕见的好消息。上周美国两党达成共识，如法案通过，美国总统在贸易协定谈判领域可获得快车道授权。该法案将成为促进贸易协议的最大助力点，且能促进跨太平洋伙伴关系(TPP)的形成。TPP即指，美国联合环太平洋的十一个国家（包括日本，但不包括中国）而形成的经济战略伙伴关系。现在，不出人所料，一切的好消息都是向着TPP顺利谈成而发展的。备受瞩目下，日本首相安倍晋三 (Shinzo Abe)将前往华盛顿，包括受邀在国会议席上发表讲话(见文章)，他声称美国和日本正在就TPP协定关键的双边协议条款进行商讨，就快达成一致了。

Yet there are two big caveats. First, fast track, formally known as Trade Promotion Authority, may still fall foul of Congress. Second, Japan may not make any serious cuts to tariffs that protect its farmers. Those outcomes are more likely because the Obama administration and the Japanese government have made a similar mistake: both have been too quick to cast the TPP as a weapon in the containment of China.
但有两大阻力值得引起重视。首先，快车道授权(正式上称为贸易促进授权)，仍会受到国会的干涉。其次，日本为了保护农民，不可能果断地削减关税。就目前的阻力而言，奥巴马及安倍晋三政府都犯了一个极为相似的错误：过快的将TPP作为牵制中国的武器。

Flanked by Japan and America, the TPP would link countries which make up 40% of global GDP. It could boost world output by $220 billion a year by 2025. It is supposed to reform difficult areas such as intellectual property, state-owned firms and environmental and labour standards. It would join economies—from Vietnam to Australia—that lie at different ends of the spectrum of development.
TPP以日本和美国为两个最大的经济体，其覆盖的国家GDP总值能够占全球GDP的40%。且TPP预计可于2025年，为世界经济每年带来2200亿美元的额外收益。同时TPP还在一些困难领域上支持改革，比如知识产权、国有企业及环境问题，以及劳工标准。协议将覆盖从越南到澳大利亚的众多经济体，尽管它们处在不同的发展领域。

But the TPP will not happen without fast track, which forces Congress into a yes/no vote on any pending trade deal and so avoids the risk that it will be amended into oblivion. And the passage of fast track faces a lot of scepticism from Democrats (see article). Some are implacably opposed. Others want America to have a bigger arsenal with which to fight against unfair traders. Driven by a conviction that China artificially holds its currency down and destroys American jobs, Charles Schumer, a powerful senator from New York, is determined that fast track should include a provision that would make sure a trade deal included sanctions on currency manipulation.
但TPP必须以快车道授权为先决条件，才有其存在的意义。这也迫使国会尽快对这个一直悬而未决的贸易协定进行投票,以避免该法案被遗忘。但快车道授权仍受到许多来自民主党的质疑(见文章)。其中一些人对此法案表示坚决反对。而其他人则希望美国有一个更为强大的军力来对抗不公平的交易。 来自纽约的强有力的参议员查尔斯?舒默(Charles Schumer)，坚信中国人为的控制人民币汇率并破坏美国的就业机会, 因而他认为快轨授权应包括一项足以确保贸易协议能对汇率操纵进行制裁的条款。

Attaching a currency-manipulation clause to trade deals is a poor idea, both because the practice is hard to define and because the addition of such clauses makes reaching an agreement less likely. But since the Obama administration has pitched TPP as a counterbalance to an assertive China, Mr Schumer's demands are harder to ignore.
在贸易协议上增加人民币汇率操纵的条款，这是一个卑鄙的想法,原因有两个：其一操纵作法很难定义；其二，添加这样的条款只会让协议达成一致遥遥无期。但是因为奥巴马政府是把TPP作为牵制强硬的中国的一种手段，所以舒默的提议更不容忽视。

Give trade a chance、
给达成贸易协定一个机会

The same mistaken logic looks set to cause problems in Japan. Mr Abe committed his country to joining the TPP on strategic grounds—as a counterweight to China—rather than because he is a born admirer of free trade. When he entered negotiations, some of his backers thought that, by playing the China card, Japan would be spared from making real concessions: that America would care more about a pact that excluded China than about prising open Japan's most protected markets, particularly rice. Even now, Japan seems to want to keep tariffs high. The best it may offer is to allow in a fixed quota of tariff-free rice from the TPP's other members, America included.
相同错误的逻辑似乎会给日本带来问题。安倍承诺日本将加入TPP的战略基础是因为想牵制中国发展,而不是因为他是一个天生的自由贸易的崇拜者。当他加入谈判,他的一些支持者认为,只有打中国牌,日本才能免于真正去承认：美国更关心摒弃掉中国市场的协定，而不是撬开日本一直以来最受保护的市场,尤其是大米市场。即使是现在,日本似乎仍想保持高关税。而最好的解决方案是从包括美国在内的TPP其他成员国那里，准予日本需以一个固定的大米免关税配额进入。

If the China-containment logic leads to a minimalist agreement, then the economic gains from TPP will be slim. TPP's real value is to set high new standards for world trade, and that demands the boldest possible agreement. And in the long run the world gains most if China joins. The rhetoric makes trade negotiations sound like a contest. In fact, it is a battle where the more you give away the more you win.
如果说牵制中国这一逻辑造就了极简主义的协议，那么从TPP获取的经济收益将会减少。TPP的真正价值是为世界贸易设置更高的新标准,并要求尽可能大胆的提出协议。从长远来看，如若能让中国加入TPP协议，世界获益也最大。现在的措辞使贸易谈判听起来像一场竞争。事实上,这是一场你放弃越多，赢得的也就越多的战斗。