经济学人下载:美国的大规模干扰性武器(4)

The damage to America’s economy so far has been deceptively small. Tariffs cause agony in export hubs such as northern Mexico, but even if Mr Trump imposes all his threatened tariffs, the tax on imports would be worth only about 1% of America’s GDP. His poll ratings at home have held up, even as they have slumped abroad. His officials believe the experiment in weaponising America’s economic network has only just begun.
到目前为止，美国经济受到的损害看起来很小。关税让墨西哥北部等出口中心倍感头痛，但即使特朗普将所有可能征收的关税都强加于人，进口关税也只相当于美国GDP的1%左右。他在国内的民调支持率一直居高不下，而在国外却一落千丈。其官员认为，将美国经济全球化网络武器化的实验才刚刚开始。

In fact, the bill is mounting. America could have built a global coalition to press China to reform its economy, but it has now squandered precious goodwill. Allies looking for new trade deals with America, including post-Brexit Britain, will worry that a presidential tweet could scupper it after it has been signed. Retaliation in kind has begun. China has begun its own blacklist of foreign firms. And the risk of a clumsy mistake that triggers a financial panic is high. Imagine if America banned the $1trn of Chinese shares trading in New York, or cut off foreign banks.
事实上，该法案还在增加。美国本可以建立一个全球联盟，敦促中国改革经济，但现在却浪费了宝贵的善意。寻求与美国达成新贸易协议的盟友，包括脱欧后的英国，将担心签署协议后总统的一条推文就会破坏协议。以牙还牙的反击已经开始。中国已经开始将外国公司列入黑名单。而且，一个笨拙的错误引发金融恐慌的风险很高。想象一下，如果美国禁止价值1万亿美元的中国股票在纽约交易，或者切断外国银行的业务。

In the long run the American-led network is under threat. There are hints of mutiny—of America’s 35 European and Asian military allies, only three have so far agreed to ban Huawei. Efforts to build a rival global infrastructure will accelerate. China is creating its own courts to adjudicate commercial disputes with foreigners. Europe is experimenting with building a new payments system to get round the Iran sanctions, which could in time be used elsewhere. China, and eventually India, will be keen to end their dependence on semiconductors from Silicon Valley. Mr Trump is right that America’s network gives it vast power. It will take decades, and cost a fortune, to replace it. But if you abuse it, ultimately you will lose it.
从长远来看，美国主导的网络受到了威胁。有迹象表明，美国在欧洲和亚洲的35个军事盟友中，到目前为止只有3个同意禁止华为。建立一个有竞争力的全球基础设施的努力将会加速。中国正在建立自己的法院来裁决与外国人的商业纠纷。欧洲正在试验建立一套新的支付体系，以绕过对伊朗的制裁，这些制裁迟早会被用于其他地方。中国，最终还有印度，都渴望结束对硅谷半导体的依赖。特朗普说得对，全球化网络赋予美国巨大的权力。要想取代它，将需要几十年的时间，而且要投入大笔资金。但如果滥用，最终会失去。