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经济学人下载:妙招还是蠢招--美国暗杀伊朗将领(2)
And yet Iran’s thirst for revenge is surely not slaked. Even if they avoid overt forms of aggression, the Revolutionary Guards are likely to pursue other tactics, including cyber-attacks, suicide- bombings by proxies, assassinations of American officials and an array of means they have honed over the years. These reprisals could take months to unfold. As the killing of General Suleimani recedes, Iran will once again begin to probe the willingness of America to use force. In an asymmetric world weak parties often retreat in the face of force, only to return. They have more patience and a greater tolerance of pain than a distant superpower does.
然而,伊朗对复仇的渴望肯定没有消失。即使他们避免公开的侵略形式,革命卫队也可能采取其他策略,包括网络攻击、代理人的自杀式炸弹袭击、暗杀美国官员以及他们多年来磨练的一系列手段。这些报复行动可能需要数月时间才能展开。随着苏莱曼尼将军之死的结束,伊朗将再次开始调查美国使用武力的意愿。在一个不对称的世界里,弱小的各方往往在武力面前退却,然后又卷土重来。他们比遥远的超级大国更有耐心,更能忍受痛苦。
The second test is whether America’s strike weakens Iran’s grip on its neighbours. Iran has a network of militias, proxies and forward bases for its Quds Force, across an area that stretches from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea. This is about projecting Iranian power, regardless of the atrocities committed by its clients, such as Bashar al-Assad, who used nerve gas on his own people without a whisper of complaint from Iran.
第二个考验是美国的打击是否会削弱伊朗对其邻国的控制。伊朗拥有一个由民兵、代理人和圣城军前沿基地组成的网络,跨越从地中海到阿拉伯海的区域。这是为了彰显伊朗的力量,而不管叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德等其主顾犯下的种种暴行。阿萨德对自己的人民使用了神经毒气,而伊朗却没有丝毫怨言。
General Suleimani’s death deprives this grim network of its architect and orchestrator. It is too soon to judge the calibre of those who are taking his place, but if the general was as exceptional as his reputation, then his loss will be felt. It may also deprive the Quds Force of funds. The Iranian state is desperately short of money. Ordinary Iranians have noticed that resources which are going on guns and mortars might be better spent on schools and hospitals.
苏莱曼尼将军之死剥夺了由这位设计者和编排者制造的残酷网络。现在判断接替他的人的能力还为时过早,但如果这位将军像他的声誉一样杰出,那么他的损失将会被人们感受到。它还可能使圣城军丧失资金。伊朗平民已经注意到,用于购买枪支和迫击炮的资源最好花在学校和医院上。
But there are complications here, too. After the assassination, Iran is hellbent on pushing America out of the Middle East. It will start in Iraq, where it has mostly outmanoeuvred America. The government in Baghdad is dominated by Shia politicians in thrall to Iran. On January 5th Iraq’s parliament passed a resolution calling on the government to start evicting foreign troops, including 5,000 or so American soldiers. The vote is not binding, many Iraqis resent Iranian influence, and American money and weapons are valuable to Iraq. Even so, it increasingly seems more a question of when, rather than if, the troops finally go.
但这里也有复杂的地方。暗杀事件后,伊朗执意要把美国赶出中东。它将从伊拉克开始,在那里它基本上已经胜过了美国。巴格达的政府电视台被受伊朗控制的什叶派政客所控制。1月5日,伊拉克议会通过了一项决议,要求政府开始驱逐外国军队,其中包括大约5000名美国士兵。投票没有约束力,许多伊拉克人憎恨伊朗的影响,而美国的资金和武器对伊拉克来说是宝贵的。即便如此,问题似乎越来越多地集中在何时撤军,而不是是否撤军。