经济学人下载:新兴市场需要国际货币基金组织的援助(2)

These funds must be secured. America, to its credit, has already approved its share, but the biggest, richest members need to provide still more. The IMF should then follow a three-pronged approach to fighting the crisis.
这些资金必须得到保障。值得赞扬的是，美国已经批准了其分担的部分，但最大、最富有的成员国还需要提供更多。国际货币基金组织应该采取三管齐下的方法来应对危机。

First, it ought to create new special drawing rights (SDRs), a currency of sorts which is convertible into dollars but whose quantity the fund controls. This is a bit like printing money to finance a cheap perpetual credit line for every IMF member. In 2009, after the global financial crisis, the fund created $250bn in new SDRs; today it could create more than twice that amount before having to ask America’s Congress for permission to continue. Creating SDRs would provide indiscriminate, unconditional aid without draining the IMF’s reserves. However, it is controversial. The fund’s core mission is making conditional loans that are repaid, not printing money. It could take time to build the necessary support. In the meantime, rich countries should lend their SDRs to countries that are short of reserves. This may be more politically palatable than lending dollars.
首先，国际货币基金组织应该创造新的特别提款权(SDRs)，即某种可以兑换成美元的货币，但其数量由基金控制。这有点像印钞票，为每个国际货币基金组织成员国提供价优的永久信贷额度。2009年，全球金融危机爆发后，国际货币基金组织发行了2500亿美元的特别提款权；如今，在不得不请求美国国会允许这种情况继续下去之前，国际货币基金组织本可以创造超过当年两倍数额的特别提款权。创建特别提款权将在不会耗尽国际货币基金组织储备的情况下，提供无理由、无条件的援助。

Second, the IMF must alleviate the dollar liquidity shortage in solvent countries that have good institutions but which cannot borrow from the Fed. In 2017 the fund’s board rejected a proposal to provide its own swap-like funding to countries with strong institutions. It should revisit that decision. It should also explore ways of getting existing dollar reserves, which are ample at the global level, to where they are needed. For example, the fund could act as a clearing house for currency swaps, guaranteeing participating central banks against losses by graduating any debts that turn sour into a conventional IMF programme.
其次，国际货币基金组织必须缓解有偿付能力的国家的美元流动性短缺程度，这些国家拥有良好的机构，但无法从美联储借款。2017年，国际货币基金组织董事会否决了向拥有强大机构的国家提供其互换式融资的提议。董事会应重新考虑这个决定。并应探索如何将现有的从全球来看充足的美元储备转移到需要的地方。例如，国际货币基金组织可以充当货币互换的清算机构，为参与其中的各国央行提供担保，使其免受损失，方法是将任何可能变成坏账的债务转化为IMF的常规计划。

Third, the fund must persuade the world that many of the poorest countries, especially in Africa, are insolvent and need debt relief. Researchers at the fund and the World Bank judged in February that half of low-income countries had shaky finances even before the pandemic. In these countries there is a danger that emergency loans are used to pay off existing creditors, leaving the IMF holding the bag. (This is awkward given that, by one estimate, China lent $146bn to African governments and state-owned enterprises between 2000 and 2017.) Better to write down debts collectively. Doing this in an orderly manner takes time, but public-sector creditors should immediately suspend both principal and interest payments. And if possible, the world should co-operate to shield the poorest countries from payments to private creditors, too.
第三，国际货币基金组织必须让世界相信，许多最贫穷的国家，尤其是非洲国家，已经资不抵债，需要减免债务。今年2月，国际货币基金组织和世界银行的研究人员判断，甚至在疫情之前，半数低收入国家的财政状况就已经不稳定。最好是集体减记债务。需要花时间有序完成这些，但公共部门的债权人应立即暂停偿还本金和利息。如果可能的话，世界各国也应该进行合作，针对向私有债权人的借款向最贫困的国家提供保护。

These actions will be needed in addition to the IMF’s regular lending programmes, which will be called upon at a scale hitherto unseen. The fund has not faced a crisis like this before. It must fight it with every available tool.
除了国际货币基金组织的定期贷款计划外，这些行动也需进行下去。国际货币基金组织此前从未面临过这样的危机。必须动员一切可以动员的力量。