2009年美国国务卿克林顿在美国和平研究所的讲话

It’s easy to advocate a go-it-alone approach that ignores the cooperation needed to address universal challenges.  But we have seen the failed results of this approach.  The more difficult, but more productive path is to engage our allies and partners around the world in that hard work of diplomacy.  Because as President Obama has said, we must pursue a path that is grounded in the rights and responsibilities of all nations.  We must continue to strengthen each of the three mutually reinforcing pillars of global noNPRoliferation — preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting disarmament, and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy.  And to those three pillars, we should add a fourth:  preventing nuclear terrorism.   Stopping terrorists from acquiring the ultimate weapon was not a central preoccupation when the NPT was negotiated, but today, it is, and it must remain at the top of our national security priorities.
忽视应对全世界面临的挑战所必需的合作、提倡单独行动的做法是容易的，但我们已看到这一做法所导致的失败结果。更艰难但却更富有成效的道路是，促使我们在世界各地的盟国及合作伙伴参与这一艰巨的外交工作，因为正如奥巴马总统所言，我们必须寻求一条基于所有国家的权利与义务的道路。我们必须继续加强全球不扩散相辅相成的三大要素：防范核武器扩散、推动裁军进程和便利和平使用核能。在这三者基础之上，我们还应增加第个四要素：防范核恐怖主义。在谈判《不扩散核武器条约》时，防范恐怖分子获取这一终极武器尚不是一个核心议题，但今天它是。它必须是我们国家安全的首要议程。

As we advance this agenda, we can reduce the size and scope of the proliferation threat to our nation, our children, and future generations.  The U.S.-led diplomatic campaign began with countering immediate proliferation threats, and will seek over time to improve verification, stiffen penalties, disrupt illicit proliferation networks, reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, and allow nations to enjoy the peaceful benefits of nuclear power, while deploying safeguards against proliferation.
在我们推进这项议程时，我们能够缩小扩散对我国和我们的子孙后代构成威胁的规模和范围。美国领导的外交行动首先要反击扩散的直接威胁。今后，我们将努力改进核查、加重惩处措施、捣毁非法扩散网络、减少核恐怖主义威胁，并在采取保障措施防扩散的同时使各国能够享受和平使用核能带来的好处。

Thwarting the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran is critical to shoring up the noNPRoliferation regime.  Within the framework of the six-party talks, we are prepared to meet bilaterally with North Korea, but North Korea’s return to the negotiating table is not enough.  Current sanctions will not be relaxed until Pyongyang takes verifiable, irreversible steps toward complete denuclearization.  Its leaders should be under no illusion that the United States will ever have normal, sanctions-free relations with a nuclear armed North Korea.
挫败北韩和伊朗发展核武器的野心对加强不扩散体制至关重要。我们在六方会谈的框架内准备与北韩举行双边会谈。但是北韩仅仅回到谈判桌前还不够。在平壤向全面去核化迈出可核查、不可逆转的步骤之前，我们不会放松目前的制裁。北韩领导人不应幻想美国会与一个拥有核武器的北韩建立正常关系并取消制裁。

Together with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, the United States is pursuing a dual-track approach toward Iran.  If Iran is serious about taking practical steps to address the international community’s deep concerns about its nuclear program, we will continue to engage both multilaterally and bilaterally to discuss the full range of issues that have divided Iran and the United States for too long.  The door is open to a better future for Iran, but the process of engagement cannot be open-ended.  We are not prepared to talk just for the sake of talking.
美国与其他联合国安理会常任理事国及德国一起对伊朗实行双轨做法。如果伊朗确实打算基于国际社会对其核项目的深切关注采取切实措施，我们将继续与伊朗进行多边和双边接触，商讨长期以来造成伊朗和美国之间分歧的全部议题。通向更美好未来的大门对伊朗敞开着。但是接触的进程不可能是无限期的。我们不准备仅仅为谈判而谈判。

As President Obama noted after the October 1st meeting in Geneva, we appear to have made a constructive beginning, but that needs to be followed up by constructive actions.  In particular, prompt action is needed on implementing the plan to use Iran’s own low-enriched uranium to refuel the Tehran research reactor, which is used to produce medical isotopes.
正如奥巴马总统10月1日在日内瓦会谈后所指出的，我们看来有了一个建设性开端，但接下来必须有建设性行动。尤其必须立即采取行动，执行有关用伊朗自己提炼的低浓度浓缩铀为德黑兰作研究用的反应堆提供燃料的计划——该反应堆用于生产医用同位素。

Enhancing the IAEA’s capabilities to verify whether states are engaging in illicit nuclear activity is essential to strengthening the noNPRoliferation regime.  The IAEA’s additional protocol, which allows for more aggressive, short-notice inspections should be made universal, through concerted efforts to persuade key holdout states to join.
加强提高国际原子能机构核查有关国家是否在从事非法核活动的能力对加强不扩散体制至为关键。国际原子能机构的附加议定书——它允许进行更严格的突击检查——应当通过共同协调的努力使之在世界通用，以说服拒不参加的主要国家加入其中。

Our experience with Iraq’s nuclear program before the 1991 Gulf War showed that the IAEA’s rights and resources needed upgrading.  The additional protocol is the embodiment of those lessons.  A failure to make this protocol the global standard means the world will have failed to heed the lessons of history at our collective peril.  The IAEA should make full use of existing verification authorities, including special inspections.  But it should also be given new authorities, including the ability to investigate suspected nuclear weapons-related activities even when no nuclear materials are present.  And if we expect the IAEA to be a bulwark of the noNPRoliferation regime, we must give it the resources necessary to do the job.
我们在1991年海湾战争前在伊拉克核项目方面的经验教训说明，需要提升国际原子能机构的权力并增加它的资源。附加议定书是汲取这些教训的体现。如不使此议定书成为全球通行的标准，则意味着世界未能吸取历史教训，其后果将危害我们所有人。国际原子能机构应当充分利用现有核查授权，包括进行特别核查的授权。但也应当授予它新的权力，包括即使在没有当场发现核材料的情况下也能调查与核武器相关的嫌疑活动。如果我们期望国际原子能机构成为不扩散体制的一个堡垒，我们就必须让它获得做好这项工作的必要资源。