经济学人下载:世界经济增长放缓,中国从中受益

Some observers worry that the economy will run out of steam because coal is increasingly costly and electricity in short supply. In recent months Chinese industry has suffered power cuts reminiscent of 2004. But China had outages then because its power stations could not make enough power, points out Mark Williams of Capital Economics. It suffers cuts now because they cannot make enough money. The government has not allowed electricity tariffs to rise in step with coal prices, forcing producers to operate at a loss. Raising tariffs is the solution, even if it adds temporarily to the inflation figures.

一些观察者担心中国经济会因煤价暴涨及电力不足而后劲用竭。近来数月，中国工业重历2004年的停电灾难。但当时中国之所以电力短缺，“资本经济”的马克．威廉指出，是因为电站供电能力不足。但现在之所以停电，是因为电站没赚够钱。当局不允许电价与煤价同步上升，导致电站茫然运作。虽然抬升电价会短暂地抬升通胀，但这才是解策。

The final reason to worry is also the most grave. Many fear that China’s overstretched property market will collapse, leaving insupportable debts in its wake. The government’s curbs on mortgage borrowing and speculative homebuying are having some effect on sales (down by 10% in the year to April) but not yet on “starts”, or new homebuilding, points out Tao Wang of UBS Securities. Perhaps the government’s drive to build more affordable housing is offsetting a slowdown in unaffordable housing.

最后一个担心的原因最严峻：很多人担心中国过热的房地产市场就会崩盘，结果产生不能容忍的债务。UBS证券师王桃（音译）指出，当局打击炒楼、抑制抵押借款的措施在成交量上有成效反映（截止今年四月份下跌10%），但仍未能控制住新盘开发。或者政府推动建造更多的廉价房抵消了新建高价房的放缓。

If the bubble were to burst, developers would suffer horribly. Recent homebuyers would also find themselves out of pocket. But in China, unlike America, housing is a vehicle for saving, not for borrowing. Householders are not up to their necks in mortgage debt, although it has risen quickly to about knee height: over a third of disposable income last year, compared with less than a quarter two years before. If prices fell heavily, the damage to households’ wealth might dampen spending. But they would not be submerged in debt.

一旦泡沫破灭，发展商将陷入深渊。近期买房者亦会发现自己口袋空空。但在中国，购房推动的是储蓄，而不像在美国，推动的是借贷。虽然抵押债务在快速增长（去年占可支配收入的三成，而三年前少于二成五），但购房者并未深陷其中。如果物价过度回落，会对家庭财富带来破坏，进而阻碍消费，但不会被债务淹没。

Banks also say their exposure to property is manageable, at about 20% of loans. Their indirect exposure might go much deeper. But if their ratios of non-performing loans (NPLs) ever rose too high, the government would step in. As Stephen Green of Standard Chartered puts it, “small NPLs are a bank’s problem; big NPLs are the government’s problem.”

银行亦称其物业贷款在控制之内，占贷款20%。他们的非直接贷款可能更多。如果他们的不良贷款比重过大，政府就会介入。正如渣打银行的斯蒂芬．格林所言，“不良贷款不多，就只是银行自己的问题；不良贷款太多，就是政府的问题了。”

Given the improbability of a hard landing in China, the swings of sentiment towards its economy are difficult to understand. Ms Wang suggests one explanation: “Outside China most people’s exposure to the country is through the commodities market,” she says. “In that market, things tend to get accentuated…[they] are either great or they are a disaster.” It is like the little-known tale of Goldilocks and the Two Pandas. The Chinese economy is either too hot or too cold, but never just right.

鉴于中国经济硬着陆发生的机会不大，对待中国经济的观感波动不定令人费解。王女士提供了一种解释：“在中国外面，大家对这个国家的关注是通过商品市场。在这个市场里，事物一般会被突出强调，要么就是很好，要么就是很差。”正如童话故事“金凤花与两只大熊猫”中那样，中国经济要么就是过热，要么就是过冷，从不刚刚好。