经济学人下载:幸灾乐祸用中文怎么讲?

The second consideration dampening the regional celebrations is that many Asian countries are suffering from serious problems of their own. Of the three biggest, both Indonesia and, more acutely, India, are facing crises of confidence over their government’s failure to deal with corruption at the heart of their political systems. Even China is facing a rash of political protests. In particular, the fury caused by the high-speed train crash at Wenzhou in July, in which at least 40 people died, has raised troubling questions about the railways’ safety and, more broadly, about the political system itself.

对这个地区的喜庆氛围有所抑制的第二个考虑因素是：很多亚洲国家也是泥菩萨过江——自身难保。亚洲三大国——包括印度尼西亚以及问题更加严重的印度——正面临着本国政府无力解决政治体制中心的腐败问题。甚至连中国也惹来一身抗议，特别是7月份温州高铁追尾事故引发的民怨——至少40人因此丧生——这次事故引发了人们对高铁安全甚至整个官僚体制的质疑。

Commenting on the debt-ceiling fiasco in Washington, DC, Xinhua took American politicians to task, and asked: “How can Washington shake off electoral politics and get difficult jobs done more efficiently?” But it is hard now for even the most nationalist Chinese commentators to go to town about the superiority of the “Beijing model”. One of its supposed advantages is precisely that it “gets difficult jobs done more efficiently”. And one example it used to point to as a source of pride was the world-beating high-speed train system. Whoops.

评论华盛顿上演的那场债务闹剧的时候，新华社谴责美国官员，并提出质问：“华盛顿如何摆脱选举制，做事更有效率？”但如今即使让最具民族主义情感的中国评论家去褒奖“北京模式”也很困难。北京模式的一大优点无疑是它“集中力量办大事”。而它常常引以为豪的骄傲就是那个举世无双的高铁系统。哎呀！却出事了。

Premature adjudication
早熟的调整

The third problem with Asian triumphalism is that it is—as Asian leaders well know—premature. Western consumers remain big contributors to Asian growth. American defence spending continues to dwarf China’s, and it will be years before that first aircraft-carrier outing translates into a serious carrier-group capability. A recent study by the Asian Development Bank projected that, on optimistic assumptions, China would by 2050 account for 22% of the global economy, compared with 14% for America (and India). In another plausible, if less rosy, scenario, in which China and India find themselves caught in a “middle-income trap”, the proportions would be 11% for China, 21% for America and 6% for India. But even on the optimistic projection, China would still be, per head, less than half as rich as America.

亚洲沾沾自喜的第三个问题是——亚洲领袖对此也有自知之明——早熟。西方消费者依旧是亚洲发展的一大来源。美国的国防支出远超中国，而那才首次出航的航母要发展成一个航母集团也需要几年时间。亚洲开发银行新近作的研究表明：乐观点看，到2050年中国在全球的经济份额将占22%，而美国（和印度）只占14%。另一个不那么美妙但也有可能的版本是：中国和印度陷入“中等收入困境”，到时中国所占有的比例是11%，美国为21%，印度为6%。但即使是乐观点看，中国的人均富裕度也比不上美国的一半。

Mr Mahbubani argues that, for other Asian countries pondering the future, it is the trend that matters—and America’s is, at best, uNPRedictable. America insists it wants to remain an Asian power, and has the military muscle to do so. But defence spending may be easier to cut than “entitlements”. So America’s word may be less persuasive than China’s ever more visible presence. Long-term trends can have big short-term effects.

Mahbubani认为，对于亚洲其它正在观望未来的国家来说，趋势是一大考虑因素——而至少美国是个无底洞。美国坚称它想——也有足够的军事力量——继续当亚洲霸主。但国防支出削减容易，增加难。因此美国不可见的承诺可能比不上中国可见的实力有说服力，长远的趋势有很大的短期影响。