经济学人下载:中美芯片战(2)

Well before Mr Trump arrived on the scene, China made plain its intention to catch up. In 2014 the government in Beijing announced a 1trn yuan ($150bn) investment fund to improve its domestic industry. Semiconductors feature prominently in “Made in China 2025”, a national development plan issued in 2015.
早在特朗普上台之前，中国已明确表示要迎头赶上。2014年，中国政府宣布投资1万亿人民币（相当于1500亿美元）来改善国内产业。半导体在中国2015年发布的国家发展规划《中国制造2025》中占有突出地位。

China's ambitions to create a cutting-edge industry worried Mr Trump's predecessor. Barack Obama blocked Intel from selling some of its whizziest chips to China in 2015, and stymied the acquisition of a German chipmaker by a Chinese firm in 2016. A White House report before he left office recommended taking action against Chinese subsidies and forced technology transfer. Other countries are alarmed, too. South Korea has policies to stop purchases of domestic chip firms by Chinese ones and to dam flows of intellectual property.
中国创建尖端产业的雄心，令上任美国总统感到担忧。巴拉克•奥巴马在2015年阻止英特尔向中国销售其部分最先进的芯片。并在2016年阻碍了一家中国公司收购德国芯片制造商。奥巴马离任前，白宫的一份报告建议对中国的补贴和强制技术转让采取行动。其他国家也感到恐慌。韩国的政策是阻止中国芯片公司收购本国芯片公司，并阻止知识产权流动。

Although the chip battle may have pre-dated Mr Trump, his presidency has intensified it. He has made a national champion of Qualcomm, blocking a bid for it from a Singaporean firm for fear of Chinese competition. Earlier this year an export ban on selling American chips and software to ZTE, a Chinese telecoms firm in breach of sanctions, brought it to the brink of bankruptcy within days. Startled by the looming harm, and (he says) swayed by appeals from Mr Xi, Mr Trump swiftly backtracked.
尽管芯片之战可能早在特朗普上台之前就开始了，但他的上任确实加深了这种斗争。由于担心中国竞争，特朗普阻止了新加坡企业收购美国高通公司，从而让高通成为全国领先。今年初，一项禁止向中兴(一家违反制裁的中国电信公司)出口美国芯片和软件的禁令，使中兴在几天内濒临破产。特朗普对迫在眉睫的伤害感到震惊，（据特朗普表示）受到习近平呼吁的影响，又迅速收手。

Two things have changed. First, America has realised that its edge in technology gives it power over China. It has imposed export controls that affect on Fujian Jinhua, another Chinese firm accused of stealing secrets, and the White House is mulling broader bans on emerging technologies. Second, China's incentives to become self-reliant in semiconductors have rocketed. After ZTE, Mr Xi talked up core technologies. Its tech giants are on board: Alibaba, Baidu and Huawei are ploughing money into making chips. And China has showed that it can hinder American firms. Earlier this year Qualcomm abandoned a bid for NXP, a Dutch firm, after foot-dragging by Chinese regulators.
发生改变的有两件事。第一，美国意识到技术优势让自己强于中国。对福建晋华集成电路有限公司实行出口管制，而另一家公司也被指控窃取机密，美国政府正考虑更广泛地对新兴技术发布禁令。第二，中国对半导体领域要自力更生的鼓励激增。中兴事件发生后，习近平主席谈到了核心技术。中国的科技巨头也加入进来：阿里巴巴、百度和华为正大举投资制造芯片。中国已经表现出可以和美国公司抗衡。今年年初，高通在中国监管机构的影响下放弃收购恩智浦半导体公司。

Neither country's interests are about to change. America has legitimate concerns about the national-security implications of being dependent on Chinese chips and vulnerable to Chinese hacking. China's pretensions to being a superpower will look hollow as long as America can throttle its firms at will. China is destined to try to catch up; America is determined to stay ahead.
不变的是两国的利益。美国有理由担忧依赖中国芯片影响国家安全、易受中国黑客攻击。只要美国可以随心所欲扼杀其公司，中国作为超级大国的主张就略显空洞。中国注定会努力赶上；美国决心保持领先。