经济学人下载:中国城镇化,你生活在哪里?

Without such documents a market could not take off. Regulations dating back at least to 1997 have obliged officials to issue them. But Landesa, an American NGO, says a survey it conducted in mid-2010 in 17 provinces, along with Renmin University and Michigan State University, found that only 44% of respondents had a complete set of certificates. One in three had no documents at all. In April the central government urged the whole country to finish issuing the certificates by the end of 2012. Dayi county, chosen by Chengdu as a trailblazer for land reform, says it got the job done by the middle of last year. But one peasant fumes that officials never bothered to give her any documents and seizedher house and farmland a few months ago for a development project. “Liu was a great landlord,” she says. “I wish officials today were like him.”

缺少这些文书档案，市场就无法起飞。最少也能追溯至1997年的管理文件让心存感激的政府官员们得以进行登记。但一家美国NGO（非政府组织）Landesa说到，其在2010年中期与人民大学和密歇根大学一道对17个省市进行一项调查，发现仅有44%的调查对象有一套完整的凭证。三分之一的对象根本就没有这些文书档案。4月，中央政府要求全国在2012年前完成对户口的登记。被成都市选出来作为土改先行先试点的大邑县说，在去年年中它就已经完成了这一任务。但是一位农民口口声声的说政府官员从来就没有为她登记户口这事来打搅过她，反倒是在几个月之前为了一个开发项目查扣他的房屋和耕地。“刘文彩真是个大地主”她说，“我希望现在的政府官员能够像他那样子”。

Both Chengdu and Chongqing have gone a step further. They have set up markets for rural land derivatives, allowing farmers who create new land for agricultural use (by giving up some of their housing plots, for example) to sell the right to use an equivalent amount of rural land for urban development. Thus a developer who wants to build on a greenfield site that has already been approved for urban construction bids first for a “land ticket”, or dipiao, which certifies that such an area of farmland has been created elsewhere. The regulations say farmers get 85% of the proceeds: good news, in theory, for those in remote, dirt-poor areas who would otherwise have no chance of cashing in on the value created by urban expansion.

成都和重庆都已经更进一步。他们为农村土地流转建立了市场，允许开垦新地作为农田（比如，放弃他们的一些宅基地）的农民出售作为城镇开发用地的等量的农村土地的权利。因此，一家已经得到许可对城建进行竞标的开发商，想要在绿地上搞建设首先就要取得“土地票据（即：土票）”，也就是证明这一区域的农地被在别的地方得到了开垦的凭证。监管人员说，农民得到85%的收益：理论上，这对于边穷地区是个好消息，因为那儿本来就没有多少机会能够通过城镇的扩张所创造的价值而得到资金。

This is hardly revolutionary. Especially for Chongqing’s Mao-loving party chief, Bo Xilai, doing good by the peasantry would seem a canny move. But because the notion of the collective persists, the system is wide open to abuses. Local officials have considerable incentives to force farmers to give up housing land and move to more compact dwellings in order to create land for dipiao trading (some of the proceeds of which also go to village authorities). The dipiao markets in Chongqing and Chengdu have done little more than add a layer of complexity to a widespread trend in many parts of China that has often added to peasants’ grievances.

这几乎就是革命。尤其对于重庆的那位热爱毛主席的党领袖薄熙来，施惠于农是会被看作是精明的行动的。但是因为国民的集体主义倾向，这个体制因大开口子而被滥用。当地政府官员因可观的激励机制而推动农民放弃宅基地，迁移到更为集中的定居点，以创造用于“地票”交易的土体（这中间的一部分利益被赋予给了村镇干部）。成都和重庆的地票市场除了比在中国的许多地区广泛风行的，通常是增加农民的满腹牢骚的错综复杂的局面更添一层复杂之外，也没有干出些别的什么。

Reform might quickly be exploited by the very forces it is meant to constrain: rapacious local governments and developers
改革很快会受到那些本来应该被平抑的力量的剥削：贪婪的当地政府和开发商。