经济学人下载:人民币的崛起

Could the yuan become a rival? China’s economy will probably surpass America’s in outright size within 20 years. It is already a bigger exporter. It is prodding firms to settle trade and even acquire foreign companies in its own currency. That is adding to a pool of “redbacks” outside its borders. These offshore yuan are, in turn, being tapped by borrowers, issuing “dim sum” bonds in Hong Kong (see article).
 
人民币能成为美元的竞争对手吗？中国的经济规模会在未来二十年超过美国。它已经是世界上最大的出口国。并且还在鼓励本国企业用人民币收购国外企业以降低贸易额。这些人民币不断进入离岸市场。于是，这些离岸存在的人民币被借方挖掘出来并在香港发行了“点心债券”。

But as the dollar’s history shows, economic clout is not enough without financial sophistication (see article). If foreigners are to store their wealth in yuan, they will need financial instruments that are safe, stable and easily sold. Dim sum makes for a tasty appetiser. But the main feast of China’s financial assets is onshore and off-limits, thanks to its strict capital controls. The government remains deeply reluctant to let foreigners hold, buy and sell these assets, except under tight limits. Indeed, it is barely ready to give its own people financial freedom: interest on bank deposits is capped; shares are largely owned by state entities; and bonds are chiefly held by the banks—which are, in turn, mostly owned by the state.
     
 但是，美元的发展历史指出没有金融体系的深度复杂，经济地位无法支撑一国货币的国际化。如果外国人用人民币来储存其财富，他就需要安全，稳定且易于卖出的金融工具。从这个角度讲，点心债券只是一个开始。由于严格的资本管制，中国绝大部分金融资产处于国内而且还是政策禁区。除非十分严格的条件下，政府在很大程度上尚不愿意让外国人持有、购买和卖出这些资产。事实上，它也没有给予其居民在金融上的自由：银行存款利率是国家规定的；股票市场中的很大份额属于国家所有；债券主要由银行持有——而这些银行主要也是国有银行。

Over time China will relax its financial grip. But even if it could usurp the dollar’s role as the world’s currency, it will not replicate the American set-up. The United States takes advantage of the dollar’s position to borrow cheaply from the rest of the world, selling its assets in return for goods. China is a mirror image of this. It runs a trade surplus, selling goods in return for financial claims on foreigners. Its firms, households and government save more than they can invest at home.

随着时间的推移，中国会放松其对金融的掌控。但即使可以替代美元成为世界货币，它也无法重现美国对该地位的运用。美国利用其美元地位从世界其它地方低价借款并卖出资产以获得商品。中国则正好相反。它拥有大量贸易盈余，卖出商品以获得金融资产的所有权。它的企业、家庭和政府积累的储蓄远远高于其国内投资。

A different kind of perk
不同的收益

Rather than seeking to borrow in its own currency, China may harbour the opposite ambition: to lend in its own currency. The exorbitant privilege it may covet is a lower foreign-exchange risk on its savings. On top of the trillions China has lent to America’s treasury, it also holds stakes in Australian mines, African farms and Swedish car companies. But because none of these assets is in yuan, China suffers a capital loss whenever its currency strengthens. It would no doubt like to share some of this risk with the rest of the world. The model is not America, but Germany, an international creditor which holds 70% of its foreign assets in euros.

除了希望用人民币借钱外，中国可能还有更大的抱负：用人民币给别人借钱。这样做带来的好处是降低本国储蓄的汇率风险。在中国的外汇储备中，中国借出钱最多的是给美国财政部，同时它还持有很多澳大利亚矿业、非洲农场以及瑞典汽车公司的股份。但是由于这些资产都不是用人民币计算的，所以如果人民币走强，将面临较大的资本损失。当然，毫无疑问的是这种风险是由全世界承担的。德国作为世界性的债权国，其70%的国外资金都用欧元计价。

There is a catch, though. No one will want to borrow in a currency that is only ever going to strengthen, increasing the value of their debts. So if China wants to “yuanify” some of its claims on the rest of the world, it will need a currency that can go down as well as up. To make people believe the yuan can fall tomorrow, China will have to loosen its currency’s peg and let it rise faster today. China is different from America: it is a rising economic power and a thrifty one. But one rule still holds: China will have to open its financial system to the world if the yuan is to be the dominant currency.

这里面还是有一些困难的。没人喜欢借入会一直走强的货币，这样会增加相应的负债。因此如果中国想人民币化它在世界其它地方的资产，就需要一种可能升值也可能贬值的货币。为了让别人相信人民币会在未来贬值，中国应该加强其盯住美元的策略，让人民币在今天快速升值。中国和美国的不同之处在于：它是一股不断上升的经济力量，而且还很节俭。但是有一个规律还是成立的：如果想要人民币成为主导货币，中国必须向世界开放他的金融体系。